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ABSTRACT 
This paper surveys the poss1bilit1es for 1mplementmg new rules for corporate governance in New Zealand It focuses on the new rules issued in Germany (the German Code of Corporate Governance) and the United States (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). The paper 
analyses both regulattons in order to find out which rules might be appltcable for New Zealand It 1s argued that New Zealand has 
to adopt a code of corporate governance in order to keep up wtth mternat1onal developments, otherwise tt nsks repelltng local 
investors and fatls attracting mternauonal investors. It 1s concluded that most 1mponantly New Zealand should adopt a pnnciples-based "comply-or-exp la111" approach rather than stnct rules. as it offers greater flex1b1ltty, which 1s pan1cularly 
1mponant in the New Zealand context. The paper further concludes that many of the rules issued 111 Germany and the United 
States ould improve corporate governance 111 New Zealand and hence should be implemented However, some of the rules implemented in Germany and the United States either overshoot the mark or do not fit mto the ew Zealand context 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text or this paper (excluding abstract, table or content, footnotes, bibliography and appendices) 
comprises approximate I y 13290 words. 
Ill 
I INTRODUCTION 
Currently corporate governance is one of the hottest topics of corporate law. 
Throughout the world new systems are discussed and developed. Predominant 
countries like the United States, Gennany and the United Kingdom have issued new 
rules in recent years. Most notably for New Zealand, its closest neighbour Australia 
has adopted a code of corporate governance as well as smaller players, like Slovakia, 
Denmark, and Kenya. The question for smaller countries is, how to keep up in the 
global competition for international investors' capital. This question will be 
researched considering the example of New Zealand. Does a small country like New 
Zealand need special rules at all? Can it afford to find an individual way without its 
system being labelled out of fashion? And which way would be the most desirable? 
These are questions, which arise in this context. 
At the moment, New Zealand is in the final stage of developing new 
corporate governance principles. Therefore, it is timely to analyse and discuss 
certain rules and approaches from other countries. This paper will focus on recent 
changes in the United States and Germany, for these countries repre ent two entirely 
different corporate structures. The purpose of the paper is to analyse the new rules 
for corporate governance in the United States - the Sarbanes-Oxley Act - and in 
Germany - the German Code of Corporate Governance - in order to find out which 
of these rules might be applicable for adopting in New Zealand. 
The paper will introduce the different corporate systems in the nited States 
and Germany and point out their most significant differences. It will take a closer 
look at the new rules issued in both countries, emphasising the different purposes. 
After that, the status quo of New Zealand corporate governance will be briefly 
outlined. It will be concluded that New Zealand needs to issue a code of corporate 
governance in order to keep up with international development and to attract 
international investors. The main part of the paper will focus on the most discussed 
topics and analyse, which of the rules implemented in Germany and the United 
States are suitable for ew Zealand, keeping in mind its specific needs. It will be 
shown that some rules do not serve their purposes and therefore are not worth 
copying. Most notably , the paper will argue that a principles-ba ed approach is 
preferable for New Zealand (rather than strict regulation) . It will be concluded, that 
ew Zealand should adopt several of the internationally favoured rules as a 
principle-based "comply-or-explain" approach, in order to achieve a flexible 
solution, but still respond to international investors' demands. 
II LIMITING THE SCOPE 
In recent years corporate governance became the most discussed issue in 
boardrooms, governments and among scholars. Following the corporate collapses of 
Enron and WorldCom in the United States, HIH Insurance and OneTel in Australia, 
and others, people throughout the corporate world began to rethink the fundamentals 
of corporate governance. Enron has been analysed to be a failure of corporate 
governance 1• Enron' s management consistently used "the most aggressive" 
accounting methods that were misleading and veiled Enron's true financial 
situation2. Its board failed to supervise and monitor Enron's management 
effectively. Its accountants were deeply involved in other business with Enron and 
therefore lost their objectivity. Since Enron was not an isolated inciden t, it provided 
an incentive to analyse and rethink the way of how business should be governed and 
managed. In response, new regulations were developed around the world3. 
Due to the huge number of new codes and regulations4 the scope of this 
paper has to be limited in order to permit for sufficiently deep discussion of some of 
the most important questions. The influences and implications of the Au tralian and 
United Kingdom regulations on ew Zealand have been analy ed by various 
entities . Therefore, this paper will take a different approach. Instead, the paper will 
focus on the German and the United States regulations and analyse their approaches 
in order to draw conclusions for New Zealand. These systems are chosen for two 
main reasons. Firstly, they represent the two basic different possible approaches. 
While the United States response to corporate failures was a rule-based approach, 
the German response represents a principles based "comply-or-exp lain" solution. 
1 Jani s Sarra " Rose-Co lored Glasses, Opaque Financial Reporting, And lnve tor Blues: Enron As 
Con And The Vulnerability Of Canadian Corporate Law" (2002) 76 St John 's L Rev 715, 716. 
2 Robert W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 8. 
3 For an overview, containing corporate governance codes or codes of best practice from more than 
35 nations, seehttp://w\\v..J...e~teven.<.:om.au/gu\ ernan<.:e/rnde~.htm (last accessed 9 March 200-+). 
~ Wolff speaks of "g lobal code fever"; Lutz-Chri tian Wolff "Law As A Marketing Gimmick - The 
Case Of The German Corporate Governance Code" (2004) 3 WA GSLR 115, 120. 
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Secondly, the two systems a lso represent the two most different corporate systems in 
capitalist economies5. While the United States corporate system represents a 
shareholder va lue dominated approach, the German sy te rn is the model sys tem for a 
stakeholder dominant approach. 
It is impossible to cover a ll topics within the scope of this paper. Therefore, 
the paper will focus on certain topics that have been approached in the recent 
discu sion about New Zea land corporate governance refonn and certain issues that 
particularly arise from the comparison between German and United States rule . 
Ill CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
ln order to understand the new rul es for corporate governance in the United 
States, the general situation before the ir imple me nta ti on will be explained briefly . 
After that, the reasons for the ir implementation will be hi ghlighted. 
A The Situation pre Enron 
The United States corporate system is characterised by a single- tier board 
(board of direc tors)6. Stock is wide ly he ld. There are usuall y no maj ority 
shareholders 7. Therefore directors are very powerful , e pec ially the C hief Executive 
Officer ("CEO"f In other words, there is a separa ti on between ownership and 
conLrol9 . Consequently, one of the major goa ls of the United State corporate 
legislation is to control the power of direc tors and protect minority shareho lders' 
ri ghts 1°. Many rules of United States corporate law are designed for that purpose. 
The predominant concept of United States corporate law is share holder primacy1 1• 
5 Thomas J Andre "Cultural Hegemony: The Exportati on Of Ang lo- axon orporate Governance 
Ideologies To Germany" ( 1998) 73 Tul L Rev 69, I 05. 
6 Su an-Jacque line Butler " Models Of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Ana lysis Of German 
And US Corporate Structures" (2000) 17 Ariz J lnt ' I & Comp L 555,56 1. 
7 Sanford M Jacoby "Corporate Governance In Co mparati ve Perspective: Prospects For 
Conve rge nce" (2000) 22 CLLPJ 5, 6. 
8 Mark J Roe "Some Differe nces In Corporate Structure In Germany, Japan , And The Uni ted States" 
( 1993) 102 YU 1927, 1936. 
9 Butler, above, 587. 
10 Gustavo Visentini "Compatibility And Compe titi on Between European And American Corporate 
Governance : Whi ch Mode l Of Capita li sm?" ( 1998) 23 Brook J lnt ' I L 833, 84 1. 
11 CA ll arwell Wells "The Cyc les Of Corporate Social Responsibi lity: A Hi storical Retrospective 
Fo r The Twenty-First Century" (2002) 5 1 UMKC L Rev 77, 78. 
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The purpose of the corporation 1s to earn money for the shareholders. Other 
stakeholders' rights are not taken into account12. 
Prior to the recent scandals, United States scholars saw United States 
corporate law as superior 13 . United States economy had seen a decade of continuing 
growth 14 . Hence, the shock about apparent failures in the system was even more 
startling. That may explain in part the radical reaction , implementing several new 
regulations in a very short period of time. The most significant one was the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is outlined be low. 
B The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The situation in the United States changed significantly with the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (the "Act"). 
The Act is a response to the latest scandals in United States companies, 
involving Enron, WorldCom and Tyco (to name just the larger ones) . After the e 
scandals there was high press ure on the legisl ator to improve corporate law in order 
to avoid such scandals in the future 15. A United States Senator, Paul A. Sarbanes 16, 
and Representative, Michael Oxley, developed a catalogue of new rules designed to 
avoid candals in the future and improve corporate governance. The Act was the 
result of these efforts 17 . In order to fulfil the desire of angry investors thi s Act 
18 implemented many new rules very strict requirement 
The Act represents the most comprehensive sec uriti es legis lation in the 
United States since the l930's 19. It extends beyond sec urities law and corporate 
governance and affects many areas of business conduct. The rul es affect managers 
and direc tors as well as accountants and even lawyer . In sum, it can be sa id that 
12 Sanford M Jacoby "Employee Representation And Corpora te Governance: A Mi ss ing Link" (2001) 
3 UPAJLEL449, 475. 
13 Brett H McDonnell "Convergence in Corporate Governance - Poss ible, But Not Des irable" (2002) 
47 Viii L Rev 34 1,346. 
14 Robe rt W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 6. 
15 Kathryn Stewart Lehman "Executi ve Compe nsati on Following The Sarbane -Oxley Act Of 2002" 
(2003) 8 1 NCLR 2 11 5, 2 11 7. 
16 Who was the main contributor; I lami lton, above, 3. 
17 Stewart Le hman , above, 2 11 7-2 11 8. 
18 Brian Kim "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (2003) 40 Harv J Legis 235, 236. 
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every person that is in a position to monitor a company, is now responsible to do o. 
It was the first time, the Federal government reached into the area of corporate 
governance which before was only a matter reserved for the States and the State 
courts20. The government wanted to install more control over all responsible persons 
in order to prevent corporate governance failures in the future . 
The Act is a very strict rule-based approach and was signed into law on 30 
July 200i11 . It was drafted without further surveys and without involving the 
business community22 . The most important rules will be discussed in deta il when 
evaluating the sense of implementing them in New Zealand. As will be shown, ome 
of them overshoot the mark . 
IV CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY 
Before discussing the new rul es in German corporate governance, the genera l 
situation as well as the reason for the ir implementation will be outlined. 
A The Situation before the Corporate Governance Code 2002 
German corporate law is characterised by a two- ti er board sys tem23 . Be ide 
the managing board ("Yorstand") there is a second board, called the supervisory 
board ("Aufsichtsrat"}24 . The managing board is responsible for representing the 
company and conducting its affairs25 . For the day-to-day conduct of business it often 
appoints exec uti ves26 . The supervi sory board is not in volved in day- to-day bu ine s. 
Its main function is monitoring the managing board27 . Its further statutory 
responsibilities include approval of certain manageme nt decisions, examining the 
19 Stewart Lehman, above, 21 18. 
20 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creati ve Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 989. 
21 Kim, above, 235-236. 
22 Robert W Hami lton "The Cris is In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 46. 
23 Peter Burbidge "Creating Hi gh Performance Boardrooms And Workplaces - European Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Cent ury" (2003) 28(5) E L Rev 642, 65 I. 
24 Franck Chantayan "An Exa mination of American and German Corporate Law orms" (2002) 16 
St. John 's J Legal Comment. 431, 436-437. 
25 Mahmut Yavasi "Shareholding And Board Structures Of German And UK Companies" (200 1) 
22(2) Comp Law 47 , -1-8. 
26 Chan tayan, above, 44 l . 
27 Su an-Jacqueline Butler " Models Of Modern Corporati ons: A Comparati ve Ana lysis Of German 
And US Corporate Structures" (2000) 17 Ariz J lnt ' I & Comp L 555,564. 
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company's books, and reviewing its assets28. Apart from that, the supervisory board 
appoints members of the managing board and reports to the shareholders29 . The 
supervisory board consists of half of members elected by the general shareholder 
meeting30 . The second half of the supervisory board consists of employee 
representatives31 . This reflects the German system of co-determination32 . However, 
despite the fact that there is an even number of employee- and shareholder-elected 
representatives on the board, there is only "quasi-parity", because the chainnan, who 
is elected by the shareholders, has a casting vote33 . Nevertheless, the mandatory 
involvement of employees in governing a corporation shows that German company 
law goes beyond the interes t of shareholders and takes other stakeholders' interest 
into account as we11 3-1. 
Apart from that, the shareholder structure is worth menti oning. As in some 
other European countries15, stoc k in Germany is he ld by some large, often majority, 
shareholders36 . For example, e ighty per cent of the top 170 firms li sted in Germany 
had at leas t one shareholder owning at leas t twenty-five per cent of the shares in the 
late 1990's37 . Fifty-seven per cent even had a majority shareholder38 . The 
shareholding structure influences corporate governance. The large shareholders have 
28 C hantayan, above, 437 . 
29 Lutz-Chri stian Wolff "Law As A Marketing Gimmick - The Case Of The German Corporate 
Governance Code" (200-l) 3 WAUGSLR 11 5, 117- 11 8. 
30 Hans-Chris toph Hirt "The Review Of The Role And Effectiveness Of on-Executive Directors: A 
Critical Assessment With Particu lar reference To The German Two-Tier Board System: Part ll " 
(2003) 14(8) ICCLR 261,269. 
31 Roberta Romano " A Cauti o nary ote On Drawing Lessons From Comparative Corporate Law" 
(1993) 102 YU 2021, 2031. 
32 Susa n-Jacque line Butler " Models Of Modern Corporati ons: A Comparative Analysis Of German 
And US Corporate Structures" (2000) 17 Ariz J lnt ' I & Comp L 555, 56 1-562. 
33 I-Jans-C hri stop h Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determination And 
Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 352. 
34 Peter Burbidge "Creating High Performance Boardrooms And Workplaces - European Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Century" (2003) 28(5) EL Rev 642, 642-643. 
35 For example France and Italy; Gustavo Visentini "Compatibility And Competition Between 
European And American Corporate Governance: Which Model Of Capita li s m?" ( 1998) 23 Brook. J 
lnt ' I L 833, 836. 
36 Often banks; FrankJ in A Gevurtz "The G loba li zation of Corporate and Securities Law : An 
Introd uction to a Symposium, and an Essay on the eed for a Little I lumility When Exporting One's 
Corporate Law" (2002) 16 Transnat'I Law I, 3. 
37 Jani s Sarra "Convergence Versus Divergence. G lobal Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: 
Governance orms, Capi tal Markets & OECD Principles for Corporate Governance" (2002) 33 
OttawaLRev 180, 196. 
38 Mahmut Yavasi "Shareholding And Board tructures Of German And UK Companies" (2001) 
22(2) Comp Law 47, 50. 
significant control over directors' powers39 . Consequently, one of the big problems 
for German corporate law is to control these major shareholders' power40. 
B The German Code of Corporate Governance 
There have been several changes in German corporate governance in recent 
years. The most interesting change was the enactment of the German Code of 
Corporate Governance (the "Code") in 200241 . 
In Germany, so far there have been no corporate sca ndals comparable to the 
Enron disaster in the United States. Although some scholars take the view that such 
scandals occurred, but were not published as broadl / 2, the genera l opinion was that 
German corporate governance was we ll functionin g43 . Consequently, the reasons for 
the development of the German Code lay e lsew here. 
Germany has decided that attracting international investors is the key to 
overcome its economical crisis. Most of thi s money is located with institutional 
investors in the United States44 . The problem is, that these investors have trou ble 
understanding Germany 's system of corporate governance, beca use it is significantly 
different from the United States system45 . According to studies, there i a direct 
relationship between investor confidence in capital markets and effect ive corporate 
governance46 . Some main criticisms against German corporate governance have 
been revea led. These contain a lack of transparency; a lack of focus on shareholder 
interest; the two-tier board structure; and, a lac k of independence on supervisory 
39 Hwa-Jin l(jm " Markets, Financial In tituti ons, And Corporate Governance: Perspecti ves From 
Germany" ( 1995) 26 Law & Pol lnt ' I Bus 37 1, 392. 
40 Sarra, above, l 9 I . 
41 Hans-Ch ri stoph Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determination And 
Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 349. 
42 An example mentioned is "EM TV"; Luca Enriques " Bad App les. Bad Oranges: A Comment From 
Old Europe On Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms" (2003) 38 Wake For L Rev 911 , 91 2-
913. 
43 For a reference mentioni ng several sources. ee Lutz-C hristian Wolff "Law As A Marketing 
Gimmick - The Case Of The German Corporate Governance Code" (2004) 3 WAUGSLR 11 5, 129-
130. 
44 Wolff, above, 128. 
45 Thomas J Andre "Cultural Hegemony: The Ex portation Of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance 
Ideo logies To Germany" ( 1998) 73 Tul L Rev 69, I 05 . 
46 Jani s Sarra, "Convergence Versus Divergence, G loba l Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: 
Governance orms, Capi tal Markets & OECD Principles for Corporate Governance" (2002) 33 
Ottawa L Rev 180, 187. 
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boards and among auditors47 . The German Government dec ided to address such 
criticism and thereby increase the Geiman capital market's attractiveness to 
international investors48 . Hence, the Code is a response to these main criticisms49 . It 
tries to make the German system more transparent and understandable50. 
The process of developing the Gennan Code took longer than the 
development of the Act in the United States. Two commissions were install ed, 
consisting of experts from all parts of the corporate law51 . The first commission was 
established in May 2000 and issued a final report based on ques tionnaires that had 
bee n sent to more than eighty experts and institutions52 . The second commission was 
established in September 2001 and further developed the first commi sion's 
suggestions. It finally published the German Code on 26 February 200253 . On 17 
May 2002. the German Parliament passed the Transparency and Disc losure Act 
2002, which came into force on l August 200254 . This Act in erted a new sec ti on 
161 into the German Stock Corporation Act ("Aktie ngesetz"), which requires each 
publicly listed company to annually declare whether it has complied with the 
German Code or report which provisions have not been complied with55 . The Code 
also recommends non-listed companies to adopt it56 . Due to it purpose, the German 
Code does not contain too many new rules. It contains three different kinds of 
provi sions57 . Firstly, a large part simply re fl ec ts the statutory basis of German 
corporate law in order to summarise and explain the German sys tem58. The new 
47 I tans-C hri stoph Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determination And 
Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 350. 
48 Lutz-C hristian Wolff "Law As A Marketing Gimmick - The Case Of The German Corporate 
Governance Code" (2004) 3 WA UGSLR 11 5, 128. 
49 Luca Enriques "Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment From Old Europe On Post-Enron 
Corporate Governance Reforms" (2003) 38 Wake For L Rev 9 l l, 920-92 1. 
50 Wolff, above, 128. 
51 These included investors, managers, supervisory board members, employee and tock exchange 
representatives, auditors, and academics; Hans-Christoph Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate 
Governance Code: Co-Determinati on And Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 
349, 350. 
52 Wolff, above, 12 1. 
51 Luca Enriques " Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment From Old Europe On Post-Enron 
Corporate Governance Reform "(2003) 38 Wake For L Rev 911 , 920. 
54 Hans- hri stoph Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determination And 
Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 350. 
55 Hirt , above, 350. 
56 Lutz-C hri sti an Wolff " Law As A Marketing Gimmick - The ase Of The German Corporate 
GovernanceCode"(200-t)3WAUGSLR 11 5,121. 
57 II irt, above, 351. 
58 E pecially co-determi nati on and the dual board structure. 
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rules included are orientated to concerns of United States investors. They are divided 
into "recommendations"59 and "suggestions"60. Recommendations are quasi 
mandatory , because they demand companies to comply with or explain non-
compliance in their annual report61 . Non-compliance with suggestions does not have 
to be published62 . This short description of the different sorts of provisions already 
forebodes that the German Code is far from being easily understood. The most 
important provisions will be discussed in detail below. 
V CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND 
Before analysing the sense of certain regulation , the current corporate 
governance situation in New Zealand has to be analysed, focusing on recent 
deve lopments and hi ghli ghting the question of whether New Zealand needs to 
reform its corporate governance regime. 
A The Situation in New Zealand Corporate Governance 
New Zealand's corporate regime is a mixture o f statute, code and common 
law principles63. The Companies Act 1993 provides the fundamental framework. 
Directors must act in the company's best interes ts and in good faith 6..,. It is the 
board's responsibility to manage the company's business and affairs . However, 
ultimate control is reserved for the shareholders65 . 
New Zealand's economy 1s dominated by mall to medium-sized 
companies66 . 97 per cent of New Zealand firms fall into that categor/'7. 
59 These are signalled by the use of "shall" . 
60 Signalled by the use of "should" or "can". 
61 Lutz-Chri stian Wolff " Law As A Marketing Gimmick - The Case Of The German Corporate 
Governance Code" (200-+) 3 WA UGSLR 115, 122. 
62 Hans-C hristoph Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determination And 
Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 351. 
63 Brynn Gilbertson and Andrew Brown "Corporate Governance In ew Zealand" 11 September 
2002, avail ab le on line at: hllp://www.belleullv.corn/publications/pdfs/corp 2002 11 29.puf ( last 
accessed I O March 2004) 51. 
64 Gilbertson and Brown, above, 53. 
65 Gilbertson and Brown, above, 52. 
66 Jo eph Healy Corporate Governance And Wealth Creation In New Zealand ( I ed, Dunmore Press 
Ltd, Palmerston orth , 2003) 39. 
67 Hon Joh n Tamihere , Mini ster for Small Business (Speec h at the launch of the Small Business Day 
Series, Wellington Co nventi on Centre, 13 February 2004) avai lable online at: 
http://W\\ v.. \ mall busi ness.med. eovt.nz/news/me I 077 159626.html (las t acce sed 11 March 2004 ). 
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Consequently, corporate governance in New Zealand must extend beyond large 
publicly li sted companies68. It is arguable that unlisted and particularly family-
owned and co-operative businesses require different management principles, as there 
are no public shareholders affected. Owner-managers bear the costs of their own 
incompetence69 . However, for a country like New Zealand, which has a significant 
number of these firms, it is important that even these companies try to adhere to a 
high standard of principles in general, because, due to the ir predominance, they 
significantly influence New Zealand 's corporate governance culture. 
Many New Zealand companies have performed well in recent years70 . 
However, a mong the small number of underperforming firm s were a comparatively 
large number of large companies71. This has a significant influence on New 
Zealand's economy . The international reputation of a country's economy i 
dependant on its large companies72 . lt is important to point out tha t the small size o f 
an economy does not keep it from producing interna ti onally successful large 
companies. Finnish okia or Swedish Ericsson provides good examples, despite 
their struggle in recent times. Furthermore, internationally successful companies 
offer challenging careers for New Zealand management ta lents
73
. This could keep 
them from going overseas. 
B Recent Developments in New Zealand 
There has been a vital di cussion within ew Zealand in recent years 
whether and how corporate governance should be altered. Many organisat ions and 
law firm s have contributed their own rev iews and principles. In May 2003, the New 
Zealand Securities Commission (the "Commi ss ion") started a con ultation process 
in order to identify levels of consensus and disagreement in New Zealand corporate 
68 Jane Diplock "Corporate Governance - Principles & Public Policy" (Speech at Victoria University, 
Wellington, 3 November 2003) avai lable online at http://www.sec-
com.govt.ndspc;eches/jtb03 l l03. shtrnl (la t acces ed 15 February 2004). 
69 Joseph Healy Corporate Governance & Wealth Creation In New Zealand ( I ed, Dunmore Press 
Ltd, Palmerston North , 2003) 46. 
70 Hea ly, above, 33. 
7 1 Hea ly, above, 41. 
72 Mark A Fox and Gordon R Walker "Evidence On The Corporate Governance Of ew Zealand 
Listed Companies" (1995) 8 Otago L R 317, 327-328. 
71 Healy, above, 52. 
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governance. The Commission published a background paper and a questionnaire 
that could be filled out by any interested part/
4
. The background paper identified 
nine key areas, on which the di scussion should focus . The e nine key issues were75 : 
• Ethical Conduct 
• Board Composition and Performance 
• Board Committees 
• Reporting and Disclosure 
• Remuneration 
• Ri sk Management 
• Auditors 
• Shareholder Re lations 
• Stakeholder Interes ts 
The submi ssion deadline ended 3 ovember 2003. The Commission issued 
its report "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Princ ipl es and Guidelines" (the 
"Principles") on 16 Fe bruary 200476 . The Commission issued nine princ iples, one 
for eac h key area mentioned above. However, these nine principles are very vague. 
They have already been criticised as "commonsense" and "se lf-ev ident"77 . He nce, 
they provide little guidance for corporate governance. Even though companie are 
expected to report as to how they achi eved each principle78, thi s means little for 
ensuring good governance, due to the ir vague and broad wording. The guide lines 
issued for eac h principle provide more detailed guidance. However, companies arc 
only ex pec ted to report against the principle, not aga inst the guide lines
79
. There are 
no mandatory require ments . Hence, the Principles are very weak. The Com miss ion 
H "Corporate Governance In ew Zealand, Consu ltation On Issue And Principles, Background 
Reference Paper", see at: http://www.sec-com.go\t.nz/publicauons/documents/corporate-
governance/consu ltat ion.shtml ( last acces ed 7 February 200-l). 
5 "Corporate Governance In New Zealand, Consu lta ti on On Issues And Principles, Background 
Reference Paper", above. 
76 Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" see at: http://ww\\ .sec-
com. govt. nz/ pu bi ications/documents/governance-pri nc i pies/corporate-governance- i n-nev, -
zea land .pdf (last accessed 9 March 2004). 
77 Paul Panckhurst "G uiding Rules For Directors Sit Well" (20 February 2004) New Zealand Herald 
C3. 
78 "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" , above, 8. 
79 "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Princip les and Guidelines", above, 8. 
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submitted the Principles to the Minister of Commerce. Whether this is the final word 
on New Zealand corporate governance is still unclear 0. 
C Is There a Need for New Rules in New Zealand? 
The pivotal question is whether there is a need to issue new rules on 
corporate governance in New Zealand. While New Zealand provides examples of 
poorly managed companies and there are few examples of international corporate 
success stories81 , there at least have not been massive corporate scandals comparable 
to Enron . On the other hand, the same has been true for many other countries, which 
nevertheless reacted on the international trend to implement such rules. The question 
arises, whether New Zealand is supposed to react to these developments as well. 
While one might argue that changes in the United States or Germany do not 
directly affect a small country like New Zealand, an indirect affection cannot be 
doubted. In a world of globalised capital markets ew Zealand cannot isolate 
itself2. New Zealand is extremely dependant on foreign capital
83
. There is 
international competition to attract foreign investors
84
. Hence, it must view its 
corporate governance in an international context. Shareholders are mobile. In case 
they are not happy with a company's development, they can always sell the ir stock 
and take their money to invest e lsewhere, including oversees85 . Missing out on 
international deve lopments therefore implies a double danger. Fir tly , ew Zealand 
80 This paper was mainl y written before the Principles were issued. nfonunately, the Principles were 
issued a few months later than previously an nounced. There have been no further announcements as 
to whether the ministry has any plans as to how to proceed with the Principles. This paper mainly 
takes the results of the consultati on process into account. 
81 Jose ph Healy Corporate Governance A11d Wealth Creation /11 Ne11 · Zealand ( I ed, Dunmore Press 
Ltd, Palmerston onh, 2003) 22. 
82 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, ava il able on line 
at: http://www. mi n terel I ison.co. nz/doc li brary/competi ti on/CorporateGovernance White Paper. pd f (las t 
accessed 9 March 2004) I. 
8
' David Quigg " ew Takeover Code To Enhance Shareholder Protection In ew Zealand" (200 I) 
12(3) ICCLR 111 , 11 2; in comparison, Australia - which has reacted on international developments 
and implemented new regulation on corporate governance - on ly tkpends half as much on 
international capital; Hea ly, above, 29/49. 
84 Mary E Ki ssane "Global Gadfiles: Applications And Implementati ons Of US- tyle orporate 
Governance Abroad" ( 1997) 17 Y J Int ' l & Comp L 621, 62 1. 
85 Mark A Fox and Gordon R Walker "Evidence On The Corporate Governance Of ew Zea land 
Listed Companies" ( 1995) 8 Otago L R 317, 329-330. 
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loses ground in the global competition for international investors' money8
6
. This can 
hardly be afforded, given the fact that the poor performance of ew Zealand 
companies in recent years already presents a problem to attract investors. The 
average medium-large Australian company was almost 2,5 times more successful in 
the use of capital to develop growth than its New Zealand peer87 . Given the fact that 
Australia was even less successful than companies in the United States or United 
Kingdom 88 , it is hard to see why an investor should consider investing in New 
Zealand. Secondly, New Zealand also risks losing dome tic investors who might be 
attracted by international markets. A few numbers on the New Zealand stock market 
underline this danger. New Zealand's stock market almost stagnated in the last 
decade, while markets around the world were growing strongly. The NZSE had a 
market capitalisation of$ 43.3 bn at the end of 1994 and was at$ 44 bn by the end 
of 2001 89 . In contrast. the market of the nearest ne ighbour, Australia. managed to 
grow from $ 282 bn to $ 733 bn during the same period
90
. Of course there are some 
explanations for the relatively underdeveloped New Zealand stock market apart 
from those related to corporate governance. For example, the agricultural sector is a 
significant part of ew Zealand's economy and not listed on stock markets
91
. 
Moreover, many large sectors have not been privatised in New Zealand (for example 
New Zealand Post, Transpower)92, which contribute to marke t growth in other 
countries93 . Nevertheless, this poor development might force domestic investors to 
invest in overseas markets. 
On the other hand, investors' increased mobility also presents a chance for 
New Zealand94 . Overseas investors can be attracted to invest in ew Zealand
95
. In 
86 Minter Elli son Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available onli ne 
at: hllp://\,\ \,\ ,\ .minterellison.co.nz/doclibrary/competition/CorporateGovernanceWhitePaper.pdf ( last 
accessed 9 March 2004) 25. 
87 Jo eph Healy Corporate Governance & Wealth Creatioll /11 New Zealand ( I ed, Dunmore Press 
Ltd, Palmerston onh, 2003) 35. 
88 Healy, above, 35 . 
89 SZE 200 I annual report, available on line al: 
hup://w\\ w.nzx..com/aboutus/publicationsh ZSE 200 I Annual Report.pdf (last accessed 9 March 
2003). 
90 llea ly, above, 30-3 1. 
9 1 Healy, above, 32. 
92 Healy, above, 32. 
93 For example Germany, where the Deutsche Telekom AG and the Deutsche Post AG are among the 
largest companies of the country. 
94 Mark A Fox and Gordon R Walker "Evidence On The Corporate Governance Of ew Zealand 
Listed Companies" ( 1995) 8 Otago L R 317, 328-329. 
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order to attract international investors , New Zealand has to adopt a modem system 
of corporate govemance96 . A 2000 McKinsey study among investors found that 
three quarters of them thought that good corporate governance was as important as 
the financial performance when evaluating an investment97 . The importance 
investors put on corporate governance cannot be ignored. Improving corporate 
governance will make New Zealand more attractive for long-term capita!98 . Apart 
from that, a well-working stock market might be key to New Zealand's 
development. Stock markets play an important role in today's economy by injecting 
capital to enable growth99 . A study of 47 countries found a strong correlation 
between the economic growth of a country and the size and liquidity of its stock 
market' 00 . 
Attracting international investors might have another, very important side 
effect for the long-tenn development of New Zealand economy. A prospering 
economy presents interesting and challenging careers for young and talented New 
Zealand academics. These talents often leave the country in order to find attractive 
jobs overseas' 0 '. Since these talents are thereby lost for its own economy, they 
cannot help developing it. This vicious circle can be stopped, once the local 
economy provides an incentive to stay in the country. Otherwise, New Zealand will 
keep losing many of its managerial talents to overseas companies
10
'.!. 
The fact that ew Zealand has to keep an eye on international developme nts 
does not mean that it has to blankly adopt whatever the economically leading 
95 David Quigg " ew Takeover Code To Enhance Shareholder Protection In ew Zealand" (200 I) 
ICCLR 111 , 11 2. 
96 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available online 
at: httr://www. mi nterel l ison.co.nz/docli brarv/comneti tion/CorrorateGovernance WhitePaper.JXlf (last 
acce sed 9 March 200-+) I. 
97 Jack Davis "Good Government Pay " 17 June 2003. available online at : 
httr://ww,\ .wcsr.com/CM/Ne,, s<;; 20BiteYNews9i- 20Bites 1634.asp ( last accessed 9 March 200-+). 
98 Joseph Healy Corporaie GoFemance & Wealth Creation In Nell' Zealand ( I ed, Dunmore Press 
Ltd , Palmerston onh. 2003) 14. 
99 Mark A Fox and Gordon R Walker "Evidence On The Corporate Governance Of ew Zealand 
Li sted Companies" (1995) 8 Otago L R 3 17,349. 
100 Healy, above, 32. 
101 According to experts. ew Zealand has an eq ually large number of qualified managers compared 
to other countries. However, not all of these talen ts really work in New Zealand; Healy, above, 43. 
102 Healy, above, 52. 
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nations do or international investors demand
103
. Doing so would not help New 
Zealand in the long run . In spite of that, it has to take its own unique situation and 
requirements into account. New Zealand is neither comparable with the United 
States nor with Germany. New Zealand as a smaller country, which economy is still 
very much based on agricultural products, has its unique requirements towards 
corporate governance. Therefore, it is important to critically analyse new regulative 
schemes in other countries in order to decide which rules are worth adapting. This is 
what will be done in the following paragraph in regard to the new regulations in the 
United States and Germany. 
VI PRO'S AND CON'S OF DIFFERENT RULES IN NZ 
This part deals with different questions surrounding the best approach for 
New Zealand corporate governance. The most important regulations in German and 
United States corporate governance will be discussed and weighed against the needs 
of New Zealand. 
A Strict Rules versus a Principles-Based Approach 
The basic question is how to design the system in general. This question is of 
outstanding importance, for it significantly influences the decision of whether to 
implement a certain rule or not. In the case of using a trict rule-based approach 
companies have to follow, one ha to be much more careful to create general 
applicable rules than in case of using non-mandatory principles. 
There is a general distinction between highly prescriptive rules and a 
principles-based approach 104 . One possibility for New Zealand is to follow the 
United States example and have a strict system of rules that every company ha to 
follow 105 . An alternative would be to follow the German (and the majority of other 
103 Minter Elli on Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available on line 
at: http://www. mi ntere 11 ison.c;o. nzJ<loc;li brary/c;ompeti tion/CorporateGovc:rnanc;e White Paper. pd f (last 
accessed 9 March 2004) I. 
,o~ Mark Wal hand Thomas Thesing "Extraterritorial Application Of US Corporate Governance 
Standards In Europe" (2003) 14(5) ICCLR 165, 165. 
105 Dougla M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1012. 
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countries' 106) example and install a principles-based approach 1°7 . A third possibility 
is to take a middle way between the two. One could design a system in which some 
rules are mandatory and others are left up to the individual company. 
The United States example of having mandatory highly prescriptive rules has 
the significant advantage of installing a mandatory system every company has to 
follow. This way at least following the rules is guaranteed. There is no possibility 
for companies to circumvent unpleasant rules
108
. Loopholes in regulations have 
significantly contributed to the Enron disaster. Allowing companies to decide for 
themselves whether they will follow certain rules or not, knowingly creates such 
loopholes in the first place. Keeping in mind how clever companies are when 
explaining abnormal behaviour, such flexibility contains a significant risk. 
Mandatory rules avoid such risks. Apart from that. they provide enforceability. The 
state can thereby control compliance with important rule and to a certain extent 
guarantee good corporate governance standards
109
. Furthermore, investors know the 
corporate governance structure of every company. Everyone has to comply with the 
same rules. There is no obligation to first analyse a company's annual report in order 
to find out its style of corporate governance, which could repel international 
investors. It can be concluded that a highly prescriptive mandatory approach has the 
advantage of clarity. 
However, highly prescriptive rules also have significant downsides
11 0
. The 
most important disadvantage is the lack of flexibility' 
11
. Providing a mandatory rule 
implies that either the same rule is good for every affected company or that all 
affected companies are equal. In other words, every mandatory rule implies a 
106 These other countries most importantly for ew Zealand include Australia and The United 
Kingdom; hu ://www.kesteve n.com.au/governance/codes. htm (last accessed 9 March 2004). 
107 There is a certain irony in the fact that a country lik.e Germany (which is notorious for its 
mandatory statutory law) adopts a principles-based approach re lying on market pressure to enforce 
compliance, while at the same time the United State (which usually uses se lf-regulation) implements 
strict mandatory rules; Lutz-Chri stian Wolff " Law As A Marketing Gimmick - The Case Of The 
German Corporate Governance Code" (2004) 3 WAUGSLR 115, 120. 
108 William M Rees and Saleem Sheikh "Corporate Governance And Corporate Control: Self 
Regulation Or Statutory Codification" ( 1992) 3( 11) ICCLR 370. 37 1. 
109 Though no system of corporate governance will ever be capable of completely avoiding corporate 
scandals; Brian Kim " Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (2003) 40 Harv J Legis 235, 252. 
110 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail : Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1013. 
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simplification' 1~. Corporate governance includes various different topics and areas. 
Each corporation is different' 13 . For example, a small company with a majority 
shareholder is not comparable to a multinational corporation with widely held stock . 
Hence, it is hard to believe that rules that concern the way a business is run will be 
equally applicable for every company' 
14 . Sometimes companies might have fairly 
good reasons not to follow rules that are very important for other (or even the 
majority of) companies. For example, without some fl ex ibility in regard to who is 
considered to be an indepe ndent director, many qualified candidates with excellent 
knowledge of the company's business might automatically be di squalified' 
15. Apart 
from that, the flexibility of a principles-based approach a lso shows in another 
respect. Mandatory government regulation takes longer to a lter. In today 's fas t-
h . 1 b I k . . . d I f 116 A c angmg g o a mar ets It 1s important to react on new eve opments ast . 
principles-based approach enables companies to immediate ly respond to market 
change , while keeping inves tors informed at the same time. The Commission's 
consultation process showed strong support for a princ iple -based approach in ew 
Zea land ' 17 . 
Nevertheless, a number of rul es generally apply to each company and are 
useful to ensure good governance' 18. In other word , there are severa l rules that 
principally should be applied to by every company, provided there are no 
exceptional circumstances. A principles-based approac h exac tl y serves that 
111 Hans-C hri stoph Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determination 
And Corpora te Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349. 35 1. 
112 Minter Elli son Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 Ma y 2003, available onli ne 
at: ill.lP:f /www. mi nterel I ison. co. nz/doc Ii hrar y/co mpeti ti on/CorP.QratcGnvernance White Pa e r. pQ[ ( I as I 
acce sect 9 March 2004) 2. 
111 Hirt , above, 35 1. 
114 Cath y Quinn , Peter Rowe and Chri s Linton " Where To Go For Corporate Governance?" April 
2003, avai !ab le on line at: 
http: //\\ ww. mi nte re ll ison.co.nz/doc library/comme rcial/CorporateGoverna nce .pdf (last accessed 9 
March2004) 1-2 . 
11
' Hans-C hri s toph Hirt "The Review Of The Role A nd Effectiveness Of Non-Executive Directors: A 
Critica l Assessmen t With Particular reference To The German Two-Tier Board System: Part I" 
(2003) 14(7) ICCLR 245,250. 
11 6 Mary E Ki ssane "G loba l Gadfile : Applications And Imple mentatio ns 01 US-Sty le Corporate 
Governance Abroad" ( 1997) 17 Y J lnt ' l & Comp L 62 1,675. 
11 7 "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Princi ples and Guidelines" ,ee at: http://www.sec-
com. !!O\ t. nd pu bi i ca ti ons/documcn ts/2.ovc rnance-pri nci pies/corporate govemance-i n-new-
zea land. pd f ( las t accessed 9 March 2004) 40. 
11 8 For examples, see the di c uss ion of evera l rules below . 
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purpose 11 9. It sets up principles that generally should be complied with. However, in 
case a company has a particular reason not to follow this rule, this approach leaves it 
the flexibility to do so 120. 
Notwithstanding the importance of flexibility , it is nevertheless important to 
have an enforcement tool. There is no sense in simply providing guidelines no 
company has to comply with. However, the New Zea land Principles do not impose 
any legal obligations on companies 1'.! 1• Companies are simply expected to report on 
how they achieved the vague principles . The guidelines, which include more 
detailed obligations, do not have to be reported against 12'.!. It has to be awaited if the 
mini stry plans any further regulation. The current version only provides a very weak 
system. The German approach is a "comply-or-explain" regulation. Each publicly 
held company has to e ither comply with the rul es provided by the German Code or 
explain which rules have not been complied with. There is no direc t e nforceme nt. 
The idea behind the approach is that market pressure will force companies to 
comply 1'.!3. A company that does not sufficiently comply with the rul es in the eyes of 
investors will face di sinves tment and a fall in stock price
124
. The ques tion rema ins 
whether this is sufficient enforcement. This will to a large extent depend on what 
exactly a company has to explain. There has been a debate in Germany whether thi s 
also implies an obligation to explain why a company does not comply with the e 
rules . The wording of section 161 of the Aktiengesetz leaves little room for 
discussion. There is no such obligation
125
. This is diffe rent in Great Britain for 
example. The Combined Code de mands companies to explain why they did not 
11 9 Stephen Franks "Corporate Governance Codes: Rules Or Guidelines?" (2002) 4 CSLB 29, 3 1. 
120 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available online 
at: http://www. minterel I i~on.co.nzJdocli brary/<.:ompeti tion/CorporateGovernance WhitePaper.pd f (las t 
accessed 9 March 2004) 3. 
121 "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand , Principles and Guidelines" see a t: http://www.see-
com. gov t. nz/pu bi ications/doc uments/gove rnance-pri nci pies/corporate go\Crnance-in-new-
zealand. df ( last accessed 9 March 2004) 6. 
122 "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and Guidelines", above, 8-10. 
123 Lutz-Chri st ian Wolff "Law As A Marketing Gimmick - The Case Of The German Corporate 
Governance Code" (2004) 3 WAUGSLR 115, 125. 
124 Cathy Quinn , Peter Rowe and C hri s Linton " Where To Go For orpurate Governance?" April 
2003, available online at: 
http://www. mi ntere 11 ison .co.nz/doc Ii brary/com mere ia 1/CorporateGovernance. pd f (last accessed 9 
March 2004) 2. 
125 Hans-C hri stoph Hirt '"Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co- Determinati on 
And Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 350. 
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comply with a certain provi sion 126 . The New Zealand regulation should also make 
the explanation mandatory 1:!7• It has been argued that German companies will 
explain their reasons anyway, because they will feel pre sured to do so in order to 
avoid negative sanctions by inve tors 128 . This might be true in most cases. However, 
in cases where a company does not comply with a rule for no good reason it will not 
provide an explanation. In other words, this lack of explanation requirement leaves 
another loophole. This loophole can easily be closed without causing significant 
expenditure for the companies. Furthermore, it is important to demand such 
explanation in order to make market pressure a reliable enforcement tool. Finally, an 
explanation obligation provides clarity and forces eac h company to think about the 
reasonableness of complying with each principle. 
Neither Germany nor the United States have implemented a mixed approach. 
combining strict mandatory rul es with a set of non-ma ndatory principles. Though 
the German Code contains mandatory rules, these are not impleme nted by the Code, 
but simply repeat the ex isting German lega l background . A mixed approach would 
enable the state to combine a se t of very important mandatory rules with a set of 
principles for areas where there is less neces ity for compliance or where no 
generally applicable rul es are possible. Such an approach would combine the 
advantages of the United States approach (clarity, enforceabi lity) with those of the 
German approach (fl exib ility). The consultation process for the ew Zealand 
principles showed some support for a mixed approach
129
. However, uc h a concept 
is very complicated. Keeping in mind that one of the main reasons for adopting a 
code of corporate governance in New Zealand i to attract inte rnati onal inve tors 
complication should be avoided. Therefore, a clear approach in New Zealand is even 
more important than in Germany. 
126 Hans-C hri stoph Hirt "The Revi ew Of The Role And Effectiveness Of on-Executi ve Directors: A 
Cri ti cal Asse sment With Particular reference To The German Two-Tier Board System: Part I" 
(2003) 14(7) ICCLR 245, 247. 
127 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, ava ilab le online 
at: http ://wwv.. minterel I ison.co. nz/<loc Ii brary/competition/Corpora1cGovernance WhitePaper.p<lf (la I 
acces ed 9 March 2004) 3. 
128 Hans-Chri toph Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determi na ti on 
And Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 350. 
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It can be concluded that a principles-based approach is preferable in New 
Zealand. The small size of its economy combined with the fact that there are only a 
few large companies make a strict rule-base approach unnecessary. Flexibility is 
important, because the big majority of New Zealand companies might not be 
interested in attracting international investors. For them, a huge set of mandatory 
rules would only result in unnecessary costs. Nevertheless, for ambitious and larger 
New Zealand companies it is important that New Zealand corporate governance is 
regarded as up to date with international standards. Therefore, a code of principles 
suits the New Zealand situation best. It should be designed as a comply-or-explain 
regulation, forcing a company also to explain why it did not comply with a certain 
principle. The current version of the New Zealand Principles i too weak and hence 
insufficient. The following paragraphs will analyse which principles would be 
applicable for New Zealand. 
B Code Of Ethics For Senior Financial Executives 
The Act requires every company to disclose whether, or why not, it ha 
adopted a code of ethics for senior financial directors 130 . It is the Act's only comply-
or-explain provision. The German Code does not address the topic. In New Zealand 
the consultation process showed general support for a code of ethics
131
. It can be 
said that such a code of best practice for the board should be implemen ted. 
However, one should not expect too much of it. Implementing such a code by itse lf 
does not mean the company has addressed e thical topic ufficiently
13
:!. Even Enron 
had such a code 133 . The pivotal point is that waivers of or changes in the code have 
to be disclosed and thereby are made public . Waivers from Enron's code of ethics 
enabled Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") Andrew Fastow to receive generous fees 
129 "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" see at: http:/h ww.sec-
com.eovt. ndpubl ications/doc uments/l!overnance-pri nc i ples/wrporate-governance-i n-new-
zea land. _Qf (last accessed 9 March 2004) 40. 
130 Robert W Hamilton "The Cri is In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 63. 
131 "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, Princ iples and Guidelmes", above, 42. 
132 Minter Elli on Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 !Ylay 2003, available online 
at: http://www.minlerelli on.co.nddoc library/competiti on/CorporateGovernanceWhitePa~ (la t 
accessed 9 March 2004) 13; "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand. Principles and Guidelines", 
above, 13. 
m Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1008. 
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from his self-designed "special purpose entities"
134
. New Zealand should include a 
provision that waivers from the code need to be published immediately to inform 
shareholders. 
C Auditors 
Auditing from outside companies is key to corporate control. Though inside 
monitoring through independent directors is important, outside monitoring through 
independent auditors is crucial for obtaining an independent expert opinion. Both in 
Gennany and in the United States new rules concerning editors have been 
implemented. 
I Prohibition of consulting services? 
The Act focuses quite strongly on auditors and accounting. Beside the 
enactment of the new accounting oversight board ( ee below) the Act also 
implements a number of new obligations and prohibitions concerning auditors. Mo t 
significantly, the Act prohibits an auditing company to provide certain consulting 
services to the same client 135 . Furthermore, an accounting firm is prohibited from 
providing audit services to any company whose CEO, CFO, chief accounting officer 
or person of similar responsibility worked for the accounting firm in the last year
136
. 
Lastly, the Act requires rotating the lead audit partner at lea t every five years
137
. 
The Geiman Code is less trict. It addressc the i sue of independent 
accountants in its last part. The supervisory board by law is re pon ible for choosing 
the auditor and agreeing on its fees 1
38
. Furthermore, the law requires the auditor to 
take part in all supervisory board meetings concerning financial statements
139
. The 
Code only implements two new obligations in respect to auditors. The auditor has to 
declare whether any, and then which, relations to the company or its directors exist 
134 Branson, above, 1008. 
135 Section 20 l of the Act; Robert W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" 
(2003) 40 Hou L R I, 58. 
136 Branson, above, 1009. 
1.n Section 203 of the Ac1; Hamilton, above, 5 
118 Section 7.2.2 of the German Code. 
119 Section 7.2.4 of the German Code. 
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that could influence its independence prior to its selection
140. The Code particularly 
demands not only to disclose any recent or actual (especially consulting) contract , 
but also any contracts for the following year. In case such conflicts of interest arise 
after the auditor has been engaged, it has to inform the supervisory board 
immediately. The same obligation arises in case the auditor finds any facts that 
could be relevant for the supervisory board's work, especially evidence of potential 
breach of director' s duties 1
41 . 
The question arises, whether the prohibition of consulting services for 
auditors makes sense in ew Zealand. The United States prohibition of consulting 
services beside auditing services is designed to improve auditor independence
142
. In 
2000, Enron paid its auditor Arthur Andersen US $ 25 million in auditing fees, but 
US $ 27 million in consulting fees 143. Such circumstances provide an incentive for 
the auditor not to risk the lucrative relationship to its client and undermine its 
independence 144 . However, there are two main arguments against the prohibition of 
consulting services. Firstly, these services provide the accountant with the necessary 
background information and enable it to understand its clients business. Thi 1s 
helpful for providing proper auditing services
145. Furthermore, there would be 
additional costs, because this information would have to be generated by the 
auditor146 . Secondly, consulting services provide additional income for accountants 
and thereby increase their independence
147. otwithstanding the e concerns, the 
prohibition of consulting services is a necessary step. Otherwi e, conflicts of intere t 
are inevitable. An auditor, economically depending on the profits generated from 
performing consulting services for a client is unlikely to paint an accurate picture of 
its financial situation in case of crisis
148. Financial accounting always involve a 
degree of inaccurac/ 49 . Given that, there has to be a mea ure to avoid immoderate 
140 Section 7 .2.1 of the German Code. 
141 Section 7.2.3 of the German Code. 
142 Robert W Hamilton "The Cri sis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 58. 
143 Douglas M Branson " Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1010. 
144 Brian Kim "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (2003) 40 Harv J Legis 235 , 244. 
145 Kim, above, 243-244. 
146 Kim, above, 235 , 244. 
147 Kim, above, 235, 244. 
148 Kim, above, 235, 244. 
149 Douglas M Branson " Enron - When All Systems Fail : Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corpor;te Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 100-l. 
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interdependence. The risk of losing the accounting job is financial incentive enough 
to issue favourable reports 150 . It should be avoided to make that risk even larger by 
having other businesses at take a well. Therefore, the prohibition of providing 
additional consulting services is a good idea in the United States, where there are 
several auditors to choose from. However, the question is whether the New Zealand 
situation requires such a drastic step. Opinion on this topic was divided among 
participants of the New Zealand consultation process. There was a strong view that 
certain services that could potentially undennine the auditor's impartiality should be 
forbidden 151 . It has to be kept in mind that the ew Zealand market is small. Having 
only a limited number of auditors, a general prohibition of non-audit services i 
difficult. Furthermore, the additional costs invo lved provide a bigger burden, 
because New Zealand companies are smaller than their United States counterparts. 
Therefore. a general prohibition of consulting overshoot the mark in New Zealand. 
Prohibiting only certain services is difficult, because potentially every other service 
undermines the auditor's impartiality, due to the fees paid. The different service 
mentioned in the consultation process already indicate that it will be hard to decide 
which services should be forbidden. Since the arising conflicts of intere t are 
nevertheless critical in the important fi e ld of auditing, the German rul es could be 
adopted. The company has to publish existing contracts with the auditor. This 
suggestion gained almost unanimous support among participants in the ew Zealand 
consultation process152 . The publication should also include future contracts, 
because these provide an equal incentive to be less objective as recent contract . An 
alternative would be a financial limit, allowing consultation fee on ly to be a certain 
percentage of the auditing fees. However, the majority of ew Zealand professional 
oppose fixed levels as too inflex ible
153
. 
,so Keeping in mind that the audit fees Enron paid alone were US$ 25 million. 
151 Examples mentioned included tax services, risk management, executive recruitment, and trategic 
planning; "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" see at: 
http://www.sec-corn. !!.OVt. nz/publ icat ions/doc ument~/governance-pri nc ip les/corporate-govemance-1 n-
new-zea land . pdf (last accessed 9 March 2004) 66. 
152 "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines", .1bove 66. 
153 "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines", above, 66-67. 
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2 Rotation of auditors ? 
The second question is , whether ew Zealand should implement any rules as 
to the rotation of auditors. German law does not presc ribe anything. In the United 
States, the Act requires rotating the lead audit partner at least every five years
154
. 
This rule is designed to avoid auditor and company of becoming too close. Such 
familiarity endangers the auditor's much required independence. The question 
remains, whether this goes far enough. United States legi lation topped short of 
requiring mandatory rotation of the audit company itself155 . 
Despite the fact that the New Zealand Securities Commis ion sees it as a 
good balance between cost losses and independency gains
156, the efficiency of 
simply changing the lead audit partner can be doubted. While there is a danger in the 
audit partner and the company becomin g too c lose 157 . there arc also positive factor<; 
in a long relationship. Firstly, an auditor knowing a company' performance (a nd it 
books) for years is more like ly to detec t irregulariti es. Secondly, a new lead audit 
partner would have to become acquainted, which results in unnecessary costs. A rea l 
improvement would only be to make the rotation of the audit firm mandatory . Thi 
approach serves the purpose bette r a nd would at lea t justify the dedication of time 
and money connected with changing the auditor. A di ffercnt partner in the same 
auditor firm is unlikely to criticise a colleague anyway. Therefore, there e ither 
should be a need to change the entire audit company or no obli gati on at a ll. Due to 
the limited number of audit companies and qualified auditors available in ew 
,~s 
Zea land, the latter seems pre ferable . 
154 Robert W Ha milton "The C ri sis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Sty le" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 58 
155 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Vi ii L Rev 989, 1009. 
156 The great majority of participants in the consultation process agreed on this point; "Corporate 
Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and G uidelines" see at: http://www.sec-
com. !WVt. nz/pu hi icat ions/doc umcnts/gove rna ncc-pri nc i pies/corporate governance-in-new 
zea land .pdf ( last accessed 9 March 2004) 29/65-66. 
157 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, avai lable on l111e 
at: hll p://www. mi nterel I ison.co. nz/doc li brar y/competi ti on/CorporateGovernancc White Paper. p<l r ( last 
accessed 9 March 2004) 19. 
158 The majority of partic ipants in the consultation process a lso pointed out the sma ll numher of 
qualified auditors in ew Zea land and oppo~ed mandatory rotation of the audi t firm; "Corporate 
Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and Guidelines", above, 65. 
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D Board Composition 
One of the most discussed qu stions worldwide is the question of the 
composition of the board of directors. Since the board is responsible for monitoring 
management and making critical decisions, it has a crucial function in corporate 
govemance
159
. Consequently, assigning the board is one of the most critical 
decisions in order to secure good governance. The question is, whether there is a 
general applicable recipe how to composite the ideal board. 
1 Independent directors 
The standard answer in recent years has been to foc us on independent 
directors 160. However, there has been some discu ssion about when a direc tor can be 
said to be independent. A variety of de finition s have been o ffered
161 . Howe ver, 
there are some generally applicable criteria for non-independe nce. An exec utive 
director cannot be considered indepe ndent162. Other factors regularly menti oned 
include the absence of recent employment for the company or as an advi sor for the 
company, not being affiliated with its customers or supplie r or be ing re lated to such 
people, and not being a major share holder
163 . Optimally , an independe nt director is 
free from any relationship with management and any other business interests in the 
company that could possibly interfere with the exerci e o f an independent 
judge ment164 . However, independency is a matte r o f degree. With time, a director 
that initially was considered independent will slowl y become depe ndent, due to hi s 
h . I . h 16s or e r 1nvo vement in t e company . 
1
'
9 "Corporate Governance In New Zealand , Consultati on On Issues And Princ iples, Bac kgro und 
Refere nce Paper", see at: http: //www.sec-co rn. eov t. nz/publi cati on~/<locu rnents/corporate-
!!.O \ Crn ance/consultati on.shtml ( last accessed 7 Fe bruar y 200-+). 
ic,o Jacques De lga "Corporate Governance And The Indepe nde nt Direc tor: The Independent Director 
In France" (2004) 15 ( I) !CCLR I, I; I larvey Gelb "Corporate Governance Guidelines - A Delaware 
Res ponse" (200 I) I WYLR 523, 550. 
16 1 Salee m She ikh "Non-Executive Directors: Se lf-Reg ulati on Or Codifi cation" (2002) 23( 10) Comp 
Law 296, 296-297; Ge lb, above, 527-528. 
162 Delga, above, 2. 
161 She ikh , above, 30 I; these key elements also had strong upport in the ,...ommiss ion's consultallon 
process; "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and Guide lines" see at : http://www.sec-
com. govt. nz/pu bi icat ions/doc ume nt~/ go , e rnance- pri nc i ol es/corporate-eove rn ance- in -new-
zea land. pdf ( last accessed 9 March 2004) 45. 
16~ William M Rees and Saleem Sheikh "Corporate Governance And Corporate Cont ro l. Se lf 
Reg ulati on Or Statutory Codifi catio n" ( 1992) 3( 11 ) ICCLR 370, 373. 
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ln the United States, the Act requ1res every company to have an audit 
committee composed solely of independent directors
166
. The Act also defines what 
constitutes an independent director167 . The German Code recommends that the 
supervisory board always has members, which have the knowledge, abilities and 
experience required and who are "sufficiently independent"
168
. There should not be 
more than two former members of the management board 169 . Furthermore, members 
of the supervisory board should not be directors or advisers for competitors
170
. 
German law prohibits members to pursue personal interests m re lation to the 
compan/ 71 . Any contracts be twee n the company and supervi ory board members 
need to be approved by the board 172 . Members should also report conflicts of interest 
to the board 173 , which should publi sh these and the ir trea tment to the general 
· 174 meetmg 
The different treatment in Germany and the United States partly result from 
the German system of co-detennination, which requires German companies to have 
members on the supervisory board, who are generally not con idered independent 
according to United States standards 175 . However, it is significant that the German 
Code does not require any real independe nce from its supervisory board membe rs, 
while the Act focuses quite heav ily on them
176
. The questi on arises, whether 
requirin g independent directors makes sen eat all and particularly in ew Zealand. 
The NZSE listing rules only require li sted companies to have at leas t three director , 
165 Harvey Gelb "Corporate Governance Guidelines - A Delaware Response" (200 I) I WY LR 523, 
552. 
166 Robert W Hamilton "The C ri sis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) -rn ll ou L R I, 59-
60. 
167 Lawrence E Mitche ll "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Reinvention Of Corporate Governance?" 
(2003) 48 Vi ii L Rev 11 89, 1198. 
168 Section 5.4. I of the German Code. 
169 Section 5.4.2 of the German Code. 
170 Section 5.4.2 of the German Code. 
171 Section 5 5. 1 of the German Code. 
172 Section 5.5.4 of the German Code. 
173 Section 5 5.2 of the German Code. 
174 Section 5.5.3 of the German Code. 
175 Exceptions are uni on representati ves. However, mostly the members of the supervisory board 
e lec ted by the employee are empl oyees of the company. 
176 Luca Enriques " Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment From Old Europe On Post-Enron 
Corporate Govern ance Reforms" (2003) 38 Wake For L Rev 911, 921. 
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including two ordinary New Zealand residents 177 . It recommends a minimum of two 
or one-third independent directors 178 . 
The idea behind requmng independent directors is that they improve 
corporate governance by not having own interests at stake. Hence, there should not 
be any conflicts of interest for them. This shall enable them to act in the company's 
best interest when making a dec ision without any conflicts
179 and to monitor 
management effectively 180. Furthermore, they mi ght bring fresh ideas into the 
company 181 . Hence, they can be important for counterbalancing manageme nt 's 
power182 . 
However, independent directors are also seen criticall/ 83 . There are two 
main arguments against independent direc tors. Firstly , it is que tionable whether 
independent directors devote enough time to their direc torship
184
. econdl y, they 
might not really know the company's bu iness
185 and have to re ly on the informati on 
provided to them by management186 . Because of the ir limited knowledge, they mi ght 
be unable or reluctant to ask the right ques tions in board meeting
187
. A powerful 
CEO might be able to intensify thi s effec t. On the other hand, being independent 
does not mean that directors do not have any qualification 1
88
. It is crucial to choo e 
qualified candidates. Good governance is primarily a question of substance and not 
177 Brynn Gilbertson and Andrew Brown "Corporate Governance In New Zealand" 11 September 
2002, available on line al: hllp://w\\ \\ .belle.ully.com/publicalions/pdl\/corp 2002 11 29.pdf (last 
accessed 10 March 2004) 54. 
178 Minter Elli son Rudd Walls "Corporate Governance White Paper" 2 May 2003, avai lab le onlinc 
al: hllp://www.minlerelli son.co.nz/t.locli brary/competiLion/CorporateGovernance Wh1tePaper.pt.ll (la ·t 
acce sect 9 March 2004) 14. 
179 William M Rees and Saleem Sheikh "Corporate Governance And Corporate Control: Self 
Reg ul ati on Or Slallllory Codi ficalion" ( 1992) 3( 11 ) ICCLR 370, 373. 
180 Mark J Loewenstein "The SEC And The Fuwre Of Corporate Governance" ( 1994) 45 Ala L Rev 
783, 784-785. 
18 1 Harvey Gelb "Corporate Governance Guidelines - A Delaware Response" (200 I) I WY LR 523, 
525. 
182 Saleem Sheikh " on-Executi ve Directors: Self-Regulation Or Codification" (2002) 23( I 0) Comp 
Law 296, 298. 
183 Sheikh, above, 297-298. 
184 William M Rees and Saleem Sheikh "Corporate Governance And Corporate Control: Self 
Regul ati on Or Statutory Codi fi cati on" ( 1992) 3( 11) ICCLR 370, 373. 
18' Minter Ellison Rudd Walls "Corporate Governance While Paper" 28 May 2003, ava ilable on line 
al: hup://www. mi nle re! I ison.co. nd<loc Ii brary/compel i l ion/CorporaleGovernance While Paper. lli!J ( lasl 
accessed 9 March 2004) 14. 
186 Sheikh, above, 298. 
187 Rees and Sheikh, above, 373. 
188 For exam ple, they can be financial expen s or academics. 
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of form 189 . In any case, it is important for independe nt direc tors to meet without 
management and non-independent directors from time to time in order to discuss 
issues without negative interfere nce 190. The German Code contain such a provision 
concerning the members of the supervisory board
191
. Unlike common practice, they 
shall meet without the presence of the managing board in appropriate cases. 
In New Zealand another problem occurs. Due to the country's small size and 
relative isolation , the number of qualifi ed candidates is limited1n. It is es timated, 
that Australia's new rules will force them to find 10,000 new direc tors to meet the 
independence requirements 193 . While United States and German companies can 
easily find a large number of potential independent directors, a New Zealand 
company might find that much more troublesome. Moreover, due to their smaller 
size, many New Zealand companies also require a board that is more involved in 
management, is knowledgeable about the company, and able to support the company 
as it grows 194 . Having independent direc tors alone does not improve corporate 
governance 195. It could be argued that the most important thing i to have the best 
directors on board, no matter whether they are considered independent or not
196
. 
Nevertheless, the idea of having independent directors i favourable. Chosen well, 
they can perfectly complete the board 197 . Here the fl ex ibility of a principles-based 
189 Harvey Gelb "Corporate Governance Guidelines - A Delaware Re ponse" (200 I) I WYLR 523, 
526. 
190 Minter Elli son Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, avai lable online 
at: http://www. mi ntere 11 ison.co. nz/doc Ii brarv/cornpeti ti on/CorporateGovernance W hitePaper. pd f (last 
accessed 9 March 2004) 12; they also provide an exa mple of a situation where such a meeting mi ght 
ha ve resulted in avoiding a fraud by a senior exc:c uti ve. 
19 1 Section 3.6 of the German Code. 
192 Thi s fact is also pointed out by the Commission; "Corporate Governance in ew Zea land, 
Princip les and Guidelines" see at: http://ww\,.sc:c-com.govt.n z/p uhli cations/documc:nts/governance-
p.rincip les/corporate-gove rnance-i n-new-zea land.puf (last accessed 9 March 2004) 17. 
91 Cath y Quinn, Peter Rowe and Chris Linton "Where To Go For Corporate Governance?" Apri l 
2003, avai lable on line at: 
http://ww,,.minterellison.co. nz/doclibrary/commc:n.:ia l/Corpora teGmernance. I (last accessed 9 
March 2004) 2. 
194 Quinn, Rowe and Linton, above, 2. 
195 Jacques Delga "Corporate Governance And The Independent Director: The Independent Director 
In France" (2004) 15( 1) ICCLR I, 5. 
196 The danger of mi ssing out on some of the best people in case of having a strict definition has also 
been pointed out by some respondents in the consu ltati on process; "Corporate Governance in New 
Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" see at: http ://www.sec-
com.govt.nz/publica tions/docurncn ts/goYcrnanc.;_ principles/corporate-gove rnance 111 nc\\ -
zea land.pdf (las t accessed 9 March 2004) 46. 
197 They can also have an important function 111 smaller companies by bringing experi ence to the 
board; Saleem Sheikh" on-Executi ve Directors: Self-Regulation Or Codification" (2002) 23( 10) 
Comp Law 296, 299. 
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approach pays. Companies have to be able to make exceptions for directors that are 
not independent in the sense of the definition, but where there nevertheless is a good 
reason to nominate them as a direc tor 198 . Due to the limited number of potential 
candidates in New Zealand the suggested number of one-third of independent 
directors seems reasonable. 
Some scholars even go a step further and suggest the implementation of 
public directors 19
9
. This might be an interesting idea . However, it i not suitable for 
New Zealand, as it would be a completely new approach and might rather repel 
international investors than improve their confidence in a modem ew Zealand 
system of corporate governance. 
The optimal board size is disputed. Large board are aid to be le s 
effective200 . This is true in the case of extremely large boards. They also provide an 
opportunity for single directors to hide behind others and not becoming personally 
involved in discussions. However, though smaller boards may be more harmonious, 
the danger is that such harmony comes at the cost of sufficient depth
201
. After all, it 
seems safe to assume that there is no general solution. The optimal size of the board 
will vary from company to company, depending on its size, bu iness and state of 
?Q? f d development- -. It is much more important to create a good mix o skills an 
knowledge suiting the company's particular needs. To these con iderations the 
question of board size is secondary203 . Hence, there hould not be any regulation 
regarding the size of the board . Requiring a certain number of indepe ndent directors 
will be enough. 
198 Hans-C hri s toph Hirt "The Review Of The Role And Effectiveness Of on-Executive Directors: A 
Critical Assessment With Particular reference To The German Two-Tier Board System: Part I" 
(2003) 14(7) ICCLR 245, 250-251. 
199 William M Rees and Saleem Sheikh "Corporate Governance And Corporate Control: Self 
Reg ulation Or Statutory Codification" ( 1992) 3( 11 ) ICCLR 370, 373, 
200 Janis Sarra "Corporate Governance In Global Capital Markets, Canadian And International 
Developments" (2002) 76 Tul L Rev 1691 , 1724. 
201 Stephen Franks "Corporate Governance Codes: Rules Or Guidelines?" (2002) 4 CSLB 29, 30. 
202 "Corporate Governance In ew Zealand, Consultation On Issues And Principles, Background 
Reference Paper", see at: http://ww\\.sec-com.eovt.nz/publi cations/docum~nts/corporate-
governance/consultation.shtml (last accessed 7 February 200-l) . 
203 Franks, above, 30. 
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2 Separation of chairman and CEO 
There is a wide agreement that the chairman of the board and the CEO 
should not be the same person204 . This is important, because the CEO already ha 
significant power by definition. The chairman has a fundamental role within the 
corporate system, including the overall responsibility for the board20
5
. Combining 
the two positions results in an undesirable concentration of power206 . There is no 
counterpart for the CEO. Given the fact that the chairman sets the boards agenda and 
chairs all meetings, he or she has a great influence on the way the board works
207
. 
Hence, the positions should be parted. Unlike in the United States20
8
, where the 
chairman and CEO are frequently the same person
209
, the separation of both 
positions already is the norm in New Zealand
210
. Neverthele s, there should be a 
clarification in the New Zealand principles. 
3 Limitation in the number of board memberships? 
With increasing complexity of today 's economy, it becomes more and more 
important that directors allow sufficient time to effectively fulfil their job. Effective 
monitoring requires more than simply reading the board paper and attending 
meetings211 . The German Code addresses the proble m by recommending that a 
. b d ?p person should not be a member in more than five uperv1sory oar s- -. 
Furthermore, it should be reported in the supervisory board's annual report if a 
204 "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" see at: http://ww\.v.sec-
com.govt.nz/publications/documents/governance-pri nciples/corporate · governance in· ne,\ -
zea land.pdr (last accessed 9 March 200--i) 46-47. 
205 William M Rees and Saleem Sheikh "Corporate Governance And Corporate Control: Self 
Regulation Or Statutory Codification" ( 1992) 3( 11) ICCLR 370, 373. 
206 Rees and Sheikh, above, 373. 
207 For an overview of all powers and responsibilities of the chairman, see Minter Ellison Rudd Watts 
"Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available online at: 
hu p://www. mi 1llere 11 ison .co. n ddoc Ii brary/competi ti on/CorporateGovema nee Wh I te Paper. pelf ( last 
accessed 9 March 2004) 9. 
208 In the United States only 20 per cent of the companies separate the posillons; Peter Burbidge 
"Creating High Performance Boardrooms And Workplaces - European Corporate Governance In The 
Twenty First Century" (2003) 28(5) E L Rev 642, 649. 
209 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts, above, 17. 
21° Cathy Quinn, Peter Rowe and Chris Linton " Where To Go For Corporate Governance?" April 
2003, available online at: 
hll p://ww w. mintere 11 ison .co. n zldoc Ii brary/com mercia 1/CorporateGovernance. rxJ f (last accessed 9 
March 2004) I. 
211 Minter Ellison Rudd Walls, above, 6. 
212 German law allows membership in up to ten; Section 5.4.3 of the German Code. 
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member attended less than half of the board's meetings213 . It is arguable that there 
will regularly be a correlation between the time a director devotes to his job and the 
level and quality of his or her control over management. In Germany it was not 
completely unusual that people were members of more than 10 companies' 
supervisory boards
214
. Keeping in mind that most of them have another full time 
position
215 
in another company, the question arises whether their function on the 
board exceeds pure representation . The outstanding importance of monitoring the 
executives requires the devotion of a substantial amount of time216 . Therefore, a 
limitation in the number of directorships makes sense, despite the limited number of 
potential directors in New Zealand, even though it has been feared that an increa ed 
demand in time wi ll result in increas ing direc tors ' fees217 . However, one might 
consider a larger number of memberships in accordance with the fact that there is a 
large number of mall companies in New Zealand. where directorship mi ght not be 
as time consuming as in larger corporations. 
Apart from that, it has been sugges ted to limit the time an independent 
direc tor spends on the board of a compan/
18
. While the independence of a director 
might vanish after severa l years on the company's board
21 9, such a fixed provision 
should not be implemented in New Zealand. On the other side, the director also 
gains knowledge and experience. It seems more important for eac h company to 
general ly check its board structure from time to time either way, because a company 
. d I no might require a different mix of skill s in different tage of its eve opment-- . 
Therefore, it does not help to adopt any genera l applicable rules . 
213 Section 5.4.6 of the German Code. 
2 14 Hans-Chri stoph Hirt "The Review Of The Role And Effectiveness Of on-Executive Directors: A 
Critical Assessment With Particular reference To The German Two-Tier Board System: Part I" 
(2003) 14(7) ICCLR 245, 25 1. 
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217 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available on line 
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2 18 Sheikh, above, 302. 
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552. 
220 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts, above, 11. 
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The German Code also recommends an age limit for members
22 1
. Thi 
provision does not make sense, for the focus should be on the abilities of a candidate 
rather than on his or her age. 
E Board Committees 
The installation of special board committees has been broadly discussed in 
recent times . Looking at the regulations and codes issued around the globe, it can be 
concluded that especially the installation of an audit committee is regarded a 
essential in improving supervision. 
1 Audit committee 
Both the Act and the German Code address the issue of audit commi ttee~. 
However, the extent to which they do it differs significantl y. 
In the United States, the Act requires every compa ny to have an audi t 
committee composed solely of indepe ndent directors
222
. Furthermore, the audit 
committee has to contain at leas t one " financial ex pert"
223
. Prior Sarbanes-Oxley, 
there had not been any lega l provi sions addressing an audit committee's duties
224
. 
The audit committee is responsible for hiring the accounting firm and wi ll receive its 
reports225 . In o ther words, the Act shifts the main audit responsibilities away from 
the board towards an entity that sole ly consists of independent directors in volving a 
financial expert. 
The Geiman Code is less specific226 . It states that the superv isory board hall 
form expert committees depending on the specific structure of the company in order 
to improve its efficienc / 27 . It demands the insta llation of an audit committee
228 
The 
221 Section 5. 1.2 of the German Code. 
222 Doug las M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Des truction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1006. 
223 Branson, above, I 006. 
224 Brian Kim "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (2003) 40 1 larv J Legis 235, 243 . 
225 Robert W Hami lton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Sty le" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 59 
226 Mark Wal sh and Thomas Thes ing "Extraterritorial Appli cati on Of US Corporate Governance 
Standards In Europe" (2003) 14(5) ICCLR 165, 166. 
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only other determination the Code makes towards the audit committee is that its 
chairman should neither be the chairman of the supervisory boardn9, nor a fonner 
member of the management board230 . 
The Geiman approach mu t be seen as an attempt to please international 
(especially United States) investors. There is not much logic in having an audit 
committee under the German system23 1. Monitoring the management board i 
already the supervisory board's key function. A separate audit committee might only 
make sense when it is supposed to overcome the fact that, due to co-determination, 
the supervisory board cannot be comprised of solely independent directors. Such an 
approach could only have made sense if the members of the audit committee would 
have to be independent. However, this is not the case. The German regulation 
therefore is half-hearted and does not improve corporate governance. It would have 
made more sense to address general criticism towards the supervisory board. 
The United States approach is much more interesting. The intention is to 
detect any failure in a company's accounting
232
. It had been realised in the United 
States, that one of the reasons that made scandals such as Enron possible, was a lack 
of efficient control of executive directors' powers. If independent directors with 
financial expertise, unbothered by management or directors with personal interests 
cannot prevent misleading accounting, who else could? The idea behind that rule is 
good. More independence inside a monitoring unit is hardly possible. However, it 
has been pointed out that the membership in an audit committee is almost a "full 
time job" 233 . This is likely to result in increased costs. On the other hand, in ew 
Zealand companies, due to their small size, if the audit committee focuses on its 
main responsibility of monitoring, it should not be too time consuming. Besides, 
directors generally have to realise that their presence on companies' boards has a 
legislative purpose and involves some work, rather than being pre tigious and an 
228 Section 5.3.2 of the German Code. 
229 Section 5.2 of the German Code. 
230 Section 5.3.2 of the German Code. 
231 Mark Walsh and Thomas Thesing " Extraterritorial Application Of US Corporate Governance 
Standards In Europe" (2003) 14(5) ICCLR 165, 167. 
232 Brian Kim "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (2003) 40 l larv J Legis 235, 242-243. 
233 Douglas M Branson " Enron - When All Systems Fail : Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1006. 
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easy way to earn some extra money . A special burden will be on the committee' 
financial expert. They would be considered the person most responsible for 
detecting any irregularities. This should result in improved diligence compared to 
regular directors
234
. The question is, whether bearing such responsibility will require 
increased remuneration . The expert will be the first one to be blamed in case of 
failure . However, such increased costs should be considered reasonable with respect 
to the achievement of reliable monitoring. 
New Zealand should consider adopting the main United States rule as a 
principle235 . Currently, there are no mandatory requirements for board committees in 
New Zealand236 . However, audit committees are increasingly common practice in 
New Zealand237 . Besides, they have become an international standard
238
. A separate 
audit committee can more effectively monitor management than the board. beca use 
of many board members' involvement in executive decisions. This will improve 
corporate control in case the audit committee comprises of qualified candidates. lt is 
a good idea to separate the role of the board and the committee's chairman in order 
to have another powerful person in the compan/
39
. The chairman of the board is 
often too involved with management. An independent director should therefore be 
chairman of the audit committee240 . However, one thing should not be overlooked in 
the current enthusiasm for audit committees. The installation of an audit committee 
does not absolve the full board of responsibilit/-1
1
• It is important to point that out in 
the principles242 . Besides, a financial expert should not expressly be required in ew 
234 Lawrence E Mitchell "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Reinvention Of Corporate Governance?" 
(2003) 48 Viii L Rev 11 89, 1199. 
235 The consultation process showed strong support for such a requirement; "Corporate Governance 
in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" see at: http://www.scc-
com. 2:ovt. nz/pu bi ications/documents/2:overnance-pri nc i ples/corporate-2:ovcrnancc 111-new-
zea land. pdf (last accessed 9 March 2004) 52. 
236 Brynn Gilbertson and Andrew Brown "Corporate Governance In ew Zealand" I I September 
2002, available on line at: http://www.bell2:ully.com/publications/pdf,/corp 2002 11 29.pdf (la~t 
accessed I O March 2004) 54. 
237 "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines", above, 20. 
238 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available on line 
at: http://www .minterellison.co.nz/docli brary/competi tion/CorporatcGovcrnance WhitePap..:r.pdf (last 
accessed 9 March 2004) 18. 
239 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts, above, 18. 
240 The Commission has suggested thi s as a guide line; "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, 
Principles and Guidelines", above, 19. 
241 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts, above, 19. 
242 This Commission has done that; "Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and 
Guidelines", above, 19. 
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Zealand, due to limited financial and personal resources243 . Larger companies with 
international ambition should nevertheless think about appointing such an expert. 
2 A separate second board as the more consequent approach? 
An interesting question arising from the implementation of audit committees 
1s, whether installing an independent second board would not be the more logical 
approach. 
The purpose of the audit committee 1s to monitor management. The 
installation of an audit committee is seen as necessary, because the board of 
directors (whose job monitoring usually is) cannot be trusted to monitor effectively 
due to the involvement of the executives on the board. The arising conflict of 
interest is obvious. Executive directors monitor themselves. The idea to use an audit 
committee comprised of independent directors to overcome thi difficulty is good. 
However, the members of the audit committee would be much more independent, in 
case they were not members of the board of directors at all. It is much more likely 
that they would criticise the decisions of a board they are not involved in than 
decisions they took part in themselves. 
The installation of a separate second board has not been di cussed in the 
United States. In theory, an independent second board has some ignificant 
advantages244 . The idea is to approve and control management' deci ions through a 
group without a vested interest245 . This should improve hareholder protection
246 
The rigid constitutional separation makes the independent director ' roles much 
clearer247 . There can be no doubt about their responsibilities. 
243 Though it generally makes sense to have people with financial expertise on the audit committee. 
However, there should not be a requirement to name a special person as financial expert. 
244 Mahmut Yavasi "Shareholding And Board Structures Of German And UK Companies" (200 I) 
22(2) Comp Law 47, 49. 
245 Franck Chantayan "An Examination of American and German Corporate · aw orms" (2002) 16 
St. John's J Legal Comment. 431, 439. 
246 Chantayan, above, 439. 
247 Peter Burbidge "Creating High Performance Boardrooms And Workplaces - European orporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Cenlllry" (2003) 28(5) EL Rev 6-+2, 652. 
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In practice there are some di sadvantages with German supervi sory boards. 
The first one is the ir size, which makes dec isions complicated248 . The average 
German supervi sory board contains 18 people249 . However, thi s mainl y is the result 
of co-determination. This should be avoided in case one implements a second board 
elsewhere. The main criticism is the lack of information the supervisory board has to 
deal with . Since it is independent, it relies on the managing board to upply 
information . However, in practice thi s information does not flow as required
250
, 
resulting in a lack of material to monitor the board of direc tors effic ientl /
51
• This 
problem could be addressed by having one supervisory board member regularl y 
attending board meetings as a visitor. 
It can be concluded that a separate second board could in fact be a reasonable 
alternative and a consequent development of the requirement of having an audit 
committee comprised of independent direc tors. The argument of cos t lacks proof. 
Supervisory board members are not as hi ghl y paid as management board 
direc tors252 . If one takes into account that fewer (independent) directors are needed 
on the first board as a consequence, the re mi ght in fact be no add iti ona l co tat a ll. 
Nevertheless, this approach is not favourable for ew Zealand at this point in time. 
Given the fact that international investors are repe lled by a ystem unknown to them, 
New Zealand would be be tter to implement an audit committee. 
3 Other committees? 
The Act does not prescribe any other committees. However, at lea t a 
nomination and a remunera ti on committee are common in Uni ted State 
companies253 . Some scholars dema nd making at least a nomination committee 
248 Jani s Sarra "Corporate Gove rnance In Globa l Capital Markets, Canadian And International 
Deve lopments" (2002) 76 Tul L Rev 169 1, 1724. 
249 Burbidge, above, 652. 
25° Franck Chantayan "An Examination of American and German Corporate Law orms" (2002) 16 
St. John's J Legal Com ment. 431 , 441 . 
251 Hans-Chri stoph Hirt "The Review Of The Rol e And Effectiveness Of on-Executive Direc tors: A 
Critical Asse sment With Particular reference To The German Two-Tier Bo;:rd Sy tern: Part 11" 
(2003) 14(8) !CCLR 26 1,269. 
252 Hans-Chri stoph Hirt "The Rev iew Of The Role And Effecti veness Of on-Executi ve Directors: A 
Critical Assessment With Particular reference To The German Two-Tier Board System: Part I" 
(2003) 14(7) ICCLR 245, 252. 
253 Peter Burbidge "Creating Hi gh Performance Boardroom And Workplaces - European Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Century" (2003) 28(5) EL Rev 642, 645-646. 
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mandatory m order to control the CEO's power to influence directors ' 
nominations
254
. In the Gennan Code, forming other committees is only suggested 
without an obligation to explain in case of non-compliance, but it is stated that the 
supervisory board can de legate certain topics to committees and empower these to 
decide instead of the whole board255 . 
New Zealand principles should not require the installation of committees 
other than audit committees, though several New Zealand companies in fact already 
have them
256
. This might make sense for larger companies, but the maj ority of New 
Zealand companies are small257 . There is not much sense in requiring a company 
with three directors to have a separate nominati on or remuneration committee. 
Instead, there should be a provision that an executive direc tor should not attend a 
meeting discussing his or her own remuneration
258
. The biggest problem with 
committees is that they provide an incentive for non-members to re ly on the 
committee to do all the work. While committees mi ght save the full board some 
time, it should never be forgotten that ultimate ly the full board is respon ible for all 
decisions259 . This seems to be di sregarded in the Gennan Code, where it sounds like 
committees should decide instead of the board. Thi s would lead to sma ll groups 
making important decisions without the participati on of the whole supervi sory 
board . This provision therefore endangers effec tive monitoring rather than 
improving it. 
254 The CEO therefore shall be exc luded from member hip on the nomination committee; Douglas M 
Branson "Enron - Whe n All Systems Fail : Creati ve Destruc ti on Or Roadmap To Corporate 
Governance Re form?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1014. 
255 Section 5.3.3 of the German Code. 
256 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available on line 
at: http://www.minterelli son.co. nz/doc library/competition/Corpora tcGove rnanccW hitePa~ (last 
accessed 9 March 2004) I 0. 
257 This was also pointed out by some respondents in the Commissions consultation process; 
"Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" sec at: http://wv.w .scc-
com.govt.nz/pu bi ica ti ons/documents/go\'ernance-pri nc i pi es/corporate governance In-new-
zea land. pd f (las t accessed 9 March 2004) 53. 
258 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts, above, 8. 
259 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts, above, 11. 
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F Reporting and Disclosure 
Transparent reporting and disclosure are vital for good corporate governance. 
These are the principle means by which directors and executives are accountable to 
shareholders260. 
1 Real-time disclosure and off-balance sheet accounting 
German law requires corporations to disclose any non-public facts, which 
could significantly influence its stock price . In the United State , the Act require 
"real time" disclosure in "plain English" on a " rapid and cunent base", which i 
supposed to mean within two business days of a trade261 . Moreover, the company 
also has to post the trade on its website within three further days
262. The reporting 
required only at the end of the year was one of the loopho les enabling Enron's CEO 
Kenneth Lay sel ling shares back to the company without immediate di sclo ure
261
. 
Furthem1ore, all off-balance sheet transac tions that may have a material effec t on the 
company 's financial condition have to be di sclosed
264
. Off balance sheet account 
were one of the major problems in Enron's collapse. Enron's CFO, Andrew Fastow, 
had hidden millions of dollars in debts in off-balance-sheet transac tions, u ing 
· · ,,26'i 
hundreds of so-cal led "special purpose ent1t1es . ew Zealand implemented 
"continuous disclosure" for li sted companies
266 . Hence, in New Zealand the problem 
of immediately releasing mate ria l information has been addressed alread/
67
. 
260 Greater transparency was one of the major goa ls of the German Code; I !ans-Christoph Hirt 
"Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determ111at1on And Corporate Governance 
Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 352. 
261 Robert W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 64. 
262 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1008. 
263 Branson, above, I 008. 
264 Brian Kim "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (2003) 40 Harv J Legis 235, 24 
265 For an extended overview, see Branson, above, 1000-1002. 
266 Jane Diploc k "Corporate Governance - Princi ples & Public Policy" (Speech at Victoria 
University, Wellington, 3 ovember 2003) avail ab le on line at http:/h w,, .sec-
com.govt.nz/speeches/ jds03 l 103.shtml (last accessed 15 February 200.+). 
267 The consultation process showed that a majority of respondents regard the current ew Zealand 
system as suffici ent; "Corporate Governance in New Zea land, Principles and Guidelines" see at: 
http: //www.sec-com. govt. nz/publ icat i om/docu men ts/governance-pn nc1 ples/corporate-governance-i n-
new-zea land . pd f (last accessed 9 March 2004) 56. 
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2 Quarterly reporting? 
United States and German laws on accounting requirements differ 
significantly. Traditionally, United States legislation wa much stricter. The rea on 
for these differences lay in the different structure of shareholding. Since German 
banks and insurances as major shareholders were well informed about the companie 
situation through "their" managers on the boards, they did not require the same 
amount of information small United States investors depend on. United States law 
requires companies to provide quarterly reports. This helps keeping an actual update 
on the situation of the company. German law only requires companies to issue an 
annual report, prepared by the managing board and controlled both by the 
supervisory board and the auditor. The German Code recommends providing interim 
reports to keep shareholders informed during the year268 . All reports shall be 
prepared using generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). Moreover. 
reports shall be publicly accessible; annual reports within 90 days of the end of the 
financial year and interim reports within 45 days after the reporting period
269
. 
In other words, the German Code adopted more frequent reporting from the 
United States. However, this should not be copied by New Zealand
270
. Quarterly 
reporting is extremely costly. For smaller companies, of which New Zealand has a 
large number, such a requirement does not seem to be of much use. Therefore, 
annual reporting seems sufficient in ew Zealand, especially because continuous 
disclosure requirements keep shareholders updated in the meantime. In case larger 
companies are eager to report more frequentl/
71 
they are free to do so. 
Few New Zealand companies provide meaningful details on their corporate 
governance policy to their shareholders
272
. Since good governance al o include 
information about governance itself, there should be a provi ion requiring 
companies to disclose their corporate governance policy. As with other reports, the 
companies should be required to use modern communication systems in order to 
268 Section 7. I. I of the German Code. 
269 Section 7.1.2 of the German Code. 
270 The majority of respondents in the consultation process has the same opinion; "Corporate 
Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and Guidelines", above, 57. 
271 For example in order to comply with expectation of foreign investors in order to attract them. 
272 Jose ph Healy Corporare Governance & Wealrh Creation In New Zealand ( I ed. Dunmore Press 
Ltd, Palmerston orth, 2003) 49. 
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make such infonnation available to all shareholders as well as potential investors. 
The internet provides a very cost effective method to keep all investors updated at 
. ?71 
any time- - . 
3 CEO and CFO certification requirements ? 
The Act imposes certification obligations on the company's executives. The 
CEO as well as the CFO has to certify in each report that the report does not contain 
any untrue statements and presents a true and fair view of the company's financial 
situation
274
. So far, it was enough if the report of a United States company was 
compliant with GAAP275 . Aligning United States law with the law in mo t other 
English speaking countries, the report has to go beyond the requirements of GAAP 
so that it represent a true and fair view276 . 
Apart from that, CEO and CFO have to en ure and certify that internal 
corporate controls are adequate and in place:m_ They are respon ible for designing 
internal controls that ensure the flow of financial information to them. These 
controls have to be checked within ninety days prior to certification
278
. Before the 
Act, law did not require internal controls
279
. There are no comparable provisions in 
the Gennan law or Code
280
. 
The United States rules have been criticised as being too harsh. Critic have 
pointed out the significant stress these provisions put on executives. Substantial 
penalties, including imprisonment for up to twenty years, are imposed on filing a 
wrong statement281 . In relation to the relatively small number of incapable directors 
273 The German Code recommends the use of the internet for various purposes to improve 
communication with shareholder ; see Section 6.6 of the German Code. 
m Robert W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 60. 
275 Lawrence E Mitchell "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Reinvention Of Corporate Governance?" 
(2003) 48 Viii L Rev 1189, 1201. 
276 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1005 . 
277 Hamilton, above, 60. 
278 Branson, above, 1005. 
279 Brian Kim "Sarbanes-Ox ley Act" (2003) 40 Harv J Legis 235, 247. 
280 Mark Wal sh and Thomas Thesing "Extraterri torial Application Of US Corporate Governance 
Standards In Europe" (2003) 14(5) ICCLR 165. 165. 
281 Robert w Hamilton "The Crisis ln Corporate Governance: 2002 Style' (2001) 40 Hou L R I, 66. 
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the regulation has been described as inefficient282 . Branson argues that less than one 
per cent might be affected
283
. However, it is strange to criticise a punishment 
because of rare occurrence. The problem is that the few cases in which something 
went wrong might be exceptions, but thousands of people were affected284 . Besides, 
the majority of directors have nothing to fear. They can easily certify the statement if 
they stick to the rules. A big misconception about the certification rules is that it will 
affect the business judgement rule of United States courts that give the directors the 
primacy of taking a risk when reviewing decisions285 . Critics have argued that thi 
would lead to directors and executives avoiding risks for fear of liability and thereby 
diminish economic progress. However, the Act only punishes fraudulent 
behaviour
286
. A decision made in good faith is not punishable287 . A positive effect i 
that the importance of the audit is emphasised. By linking the responsibility for the 
audit report directly to the most powerful executives of a company. the audit report 
comes into the focus of executives. They no longer can deny re ·pon ibility and are 
forced to cooperate more closely with the auditors
288
. 
New Zealand should also adopt a certification requirement for CEO and 
CF02 9. Other provisions put substantial pressure on auditor . It benefits the balance 
of pressure if the responsibility for the accurateness of reports lies with the 
executives as well290 . This way they cannot put the blame solely on the auditor. 
282 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1004. 
283 Branson, above, 1004. 
284 All the Enron employees who lost their jobs as well as pension funds should not be los t out of 
view. 
285 For example, knowingly signing a false financial statement; Brian Kim "Sarhanes-Oxley Act" 
(2003) 40 Harv J Legis 235, 245. 
286 Minter Elli on Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available online 
at: http://www. mi ntere 11 ison.co. nz/docl i brary/competi tion/CorporateGovernancc White Paper. pd f (last 
accessed 9 March 2004) 20. 
287 Kim, above, 246. 
288 Lawrence E Mitchell "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Reinvention Of Corporate Governance?' 
(2003) 48 Viii L Rev 1189, 1200. 
289 The great majority of respondents in the consultati on process were 111 favour or a certificati on 
require~ent; "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and ~uidelines" see at: . 
http://www.sec-corn . govl. nz/pu bi icalions/documen ls/ governance-pn nc1 ples/corporate-governance-1 n-
new-zea land. pd f (lasl accessed 9 March 200-l) 57. . . 
290 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts "Corporate Governance White Paper" 28 May 2003, available onhne 
al: hllp://ww,\ . m inlercl I ison.co. nz/doc Ii brary/competi tion/CorporatcGovcrnancc While Paper. pd I (last 
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4 Disclosing remuneration 
The German Code recommends that Management Boards' remuneration 
shall be published in detail in the company's financial stateme ne91 . The same 
provision exists for supervisory board members292 . However, it only requires 
disclosing the package for the boards as a whole, without breaking it down to the 
single member293 . 
An argument against disclosing remuneration 1s that shareholders could 
focus on this topic and get distracted from more important issues
294 . evertheless, 
· · "95 S transparency 1s important- . hareholders have a right to know which performance-
based parts of remuneration executives have as an incentive to work success full /
96
. 
In order to judge the incentives for every single executive, such information has to 
be broken down by direc tor. 
G Remuneration 
Directors' remuneration has become a controversial topic arter Enron. 
Enron 's directors earned millions of dollars at a time, when the company itse lf was 
already practically bankrupt, while employees lost the ir entire pension funds
297
. 
Surpri singly, the United States Act does not explicitl y address the topic of 
remuneration. Only executive loans are dealt with . On the contrary, the Gennan 
Code encourages the use of variable parts of remuneration, some of which have 
proved controversial during recent scandal s. It is questionable whether thi will 
bene fit German corporate governance. 
291 Section 4.2.3 o f the German Code. 
292 Section 5.4.5 of the German Code. 
293 Peter Burbidge "Creating Hi gh Performance Boardrooms And Wod,places - European Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty Fir t Cen tury" (2003) 28(5) EL Rev 6-+2 . 650. 
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at: h1tp://w~ w.mintere lli son.co.nz/doclibrary/competition/CorporateGovernan~Wh1tePa e r. f (last 
accessed 9 March 200-+) 7-8. 
295 Jane Diplock "Corporate Governance - Principles & Public Policy" ( peech at Victoria 
University, We llington, 3 ovember 2003) avai lable on line at http://ww\\ .sec-
<.:0m.!!.ovt.nz/speechcs/jds031103.shtml ( las1 accessed 15 February 200-+). 
296 The maj ority of respondents in the con ultation process agreed; "Corporate Governance in New 
Zealand, Princ iples and Guidelines" see at: http://www.sec-
com. govt. nz/ pu bi icat ions/doc uments/governance-pri nc i ples/corporate-gove rnance-i n-new-
zealand. pdf ( last accessed 9 March 2004) 58. 
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1 The use of stocks and stock option as part of remuneration 
In the United States, stocks and stock options are a common part of 
d. , · 298 irectors remuneration . Though there has been a substantial amount of misuse in 
connection with stock options, the Act did not approach this topic299 . 
The German Code suggests that executive remuneration shall consist of 
variable as well as fixed parts. Variable components shall include one time and 
annual components that should be linked to business performance as well as 
components containing long-term incentives and risk components. The Code gives 
the example of company stocks with a multi-year blocking period or stock options. 
Changing the relevant parameters on which the variable remuneration parts depend 
sha ll be excluded, except for a limitation (cap) for unforeseen developments 
100
. The 
same provisions exist for members of the supervisory board
301
. 
The German Code encourages the use of stock options in order to be more in 
line with United States practices. With executives being increasingly searched for 
internationally, German remuneration policy thereby is brought in line with 
international standards302. However, the question is whether this is a good 
development. 
The idea behind having flexible parts of remuneration based on companies' 
performance is to align managements with shareholders' incentives . Executives only 
earn well in case shareholders do well303 . Stock options are a popular way of flexible 
remuneration. In the United States they account for more than 70 per cent of the 
typical CEO remuneration304 . Their popularity also derives from the fact that they 
are not an expense for accounting purposes, but neverthele s are deductible for tax 
298 Christina Roschmann "Stock Option Plans In Germany" ( 1999) 12 PG I GPRAC 29, 29. 
299 Robert W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 1 lou L R I, 69. 
300 Section 4.2.3 of the German Code. 
301 Section 5.4.5 of the German Code. 
302 In grid Kalisch "Stock Options: Will The Upcoming Amendment Of The German Stock 
Corp;ration Act Facilitate Their Introduction By German Stock Corporations" ( 1998) 9(4) ICCLR 
111 , 11 5. 
303 Susan J Stabile "Enron, Global Crossing, And Beyond: Implications For Workers" (2002) 76 St 
John's L Rev 815, 816-817. 
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purposes
305
. However, stock options as management remuneration also have their 
downsides. The main problem is that they provide short-term incentives for 
t. 306 H . b . I execu 1ves . avmg a su stant1a part of remuneration at stake, executives are 
likely to focus on the share price at the time options are granted307 . The problem i 
that executives can withhold news at critical points in time in order to influence the 
stock price
308
. In other words, stock options provide a strong incentive for short-term 
focusing, which is contrary to the company's interest in long-term wealth. At least 
German law should have provided for a defined period to hold the shares before they 
can be sold
309
. Furthem1ore, granting stock options dilute the participation of 
existing shareholders
310
. Hence, the benefits of implementing stock options as a 
principle can at least be doubted. New Zealand should not follow the German 
approach and leave the decision on how to design executive remuneration to each 
company. 
2 Executive loans 
A related topic is the question of company loans to directars or executives. 
The German Code does not address this question. The Act generally prohibit 
personal loans for corporate officers and directors
311
. Before, it was the common 
practice of United States companies to grant personal loans to leading employees. 
For example, it was alleged that Tyco's CEO Denis Kozlow ki was granted a US$ 
19 million loan that was later forgiven31 '.!. Personal loans are legal under Delaware 
law, which is now superseded by the federal Act
313
. Kim however, s es some good 
reasons to allow such loans . Firstly, he mentions that CEO's have a legitimate 
interest in receiving a loan when re locating because of the company. Secondly, in 
30~ Robert W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 ll ou L R I. 72. 
305 David Millon "Why Is Corporate Management Obses ed With Quarterly Earnings And What 
Should Be Done About It?" (2002) 70 Geo Wash L Rev 890, 916. 
306 1-lami I ton, above, 70-7 I. 
307 Susan J Stabile "Enron, Global Crossing, And Beyond: Impli cations For Workers" (2002) 76 St 
John 's L Rev 815,817. 
308 Millon, above, 908-909. 
309 Millon, above, 916. 
310 Jnorid Kali sc h "Stock Options: Will The Upcoming Amendment Of The German Stock 
Corp;ration Act Facilitate Their Introduction By German Stock Corporations" ( 1998) 9(4) ICCLR 
111, 116. 
311 Robert W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style" (2003) 40 Hou L R I, 62. 
312 Brian Kim "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (2003) 40 Harv J Legi 235, 249. 
313 Kim, above, 249. 
his view companies profit from lending money to executives to enable them to buy 
companies stock, because thi s ali gns their interests with those of the company314 . 
There is no argument to the first point. It is hard to see why a highly paid CEO 
shou ld be treated differently than any other employee, who does not get any loans in 
such situation either; also he or she might need the money much more. Besides, the 
Act does al low loans for that purpose, as long as the conditions are on " market 
t "315 A f h erms . s ar as t e second argument is concerned, a simple number from 
Enron's story should be sufficient. Enron's CEO Kenneth Lay was able by uch a 
credit to purchase stock options that resulted in personal gains of US $ 100 million 
in the year of Enron's collapse
316
. However, this seems to be an American proble m. 
It would be enough if such loans just have to be published in New Zealand. 
H Shareholder and Stakeholder Interests 
The United States and the German sys tem provide examples of two 
completely different corporate philosophies
317
. While United States corporate law 
traditionally seeks to protect shareholder interes ts, modern Geiman law alway took 
other stakeholder' interes ts into account
118
. It is interesting to analyse recent 
developments . On the one hand a certain shift in German law toward strengthening 
shareholders' right can be recognised
319
. On the contrary, no sh ift towards greater 
stakeholder protection can be seen in the Act or any other new regulation in the 
United States. If one leaves minor changes320 as ide, stakeholder participation in 
corporate governance still does not play any role in Un ited States law. The question 
is , whether thi s is a misconception. 
31
~ Kim, above, 249. 
315 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Sys1ems Fai l: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1007. 
316 Branson, above, 1008. 
317 Mary E Ki ssane "Global Gad files: Applications And Implementations Of US-Style Corporate 
Governance Abroad" ( 1997) 17 Y J lnt ' I & Comp L 621, 648-6-19. 
318 Especially employees' interests ; Sanford M Jacoby "Employee Re pre entation And Corporate 
Governance: A Missing Link" (200 I) 3 PAJLEL 449, 457-459. 
319 The Code tries to i,~plemenl more attention LO shareholders' concerns. Mos: notably, thi s includes 
facilitating the use of proxies and representatives LO exercise shareholder voting that are avai lable for 
sharehold~rs during the general assembly (Section 2.3.3 of the German Code); Hans-Christoph Hin 
"German y: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-DeterminatJOn And Corporate Governance 
Reform" (2002) n Comp La\\ 3-19, 352. . 
320 Like the prohibition for director to sell stock. in blackout periods when employees are proh,bned 
from sell in g; Susan J Stabile "Enron, Global Crossing, And Beyond: lmplicauons For Workers" 
(2002) 76 St John' s L Rev 815. 832. 
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Burbidge argues that a scandal like Enron might not have happened, if the 
supervision of directors was in the hands of a wider range of stakeholders as in 
Germany
32 1
. Referring to the German situation can only mean two groups of 
stakeholders: Creditors322 and 3''1 employees -- . The question anses, whether 
stakeholders could be important and motivated monitors of the company. 
The first idea is assigning a greater role to banks. In Germany, banks as large 
shareholders play an important role in monitoring management
324
. In the United 
States, banks cannot contribute much , due to the fact that they are not a llowed 
holding shares325 . Hence, they are not in a meaningful po ition for monitoring. 
Instead, the focus in the United States has shifted to institutional investors
326
. They 
hold substantial assets and have the financi al resources and administration to 
effectively monitor companies3~7 . However, until now they failed to do so and rather 
exited companies stock instead of becoming active in changing corporate 
behaviour328 . The ques tion is, whether banks could play an important ro le in 
monitoring New Zealand companies? However, thi s cannot be prescribed by 
principles or law, but is a question of changing banks and other institutions' attitude 
towards their responsibility for corporate governance. 
The second group of stake ho lder to potentially monitor directors are 
employees. There are two ways to realise such participation. Firstly, employee can 
3,9 
be stockowners and thereby have the same rights as other shareholders - . However, 
32 1 Peter Burbidge "Creating Hi gh Performance Boardrooms And Workplaces - Europea n Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Century" (2003) 28(5) E L Rev 6-+2, 644-645. 
322 Banks playing a major ro le in German corporate law ; Bretl 11 McDonnell "The C urious Incident 
Of The Workers In The Boardroom" (2000) 29 Hofstra L Rev 503, 516. 
323 Sanford M Jacoby "Employee Representation And Corporate Governance: A Missi ng Linl.' 
(200 1) 3 UPAJLEL 449,474. 
324 Jacoby, above, 459. 
325 Mark J Roe "Some Differences In Corporate Structure In Germany, Japan , And The nited 
States" ( 1993) 102 YU 1927, 1948-1950. 
326 Harvey Gelb "Corporate Governance Guidelines - A Delaware Response" (200 1) I WYLR 523, 
523. 
327 Hans-C hri stoph Hirt "The Review Of The Role And Effec ti veness Of on-Exec utive Directors : A 
Critical Assessment With Parti cu lar re ference To The German Two-Tier Board System: Part II" 
(2003) 14(8) !CC LR 26 1,264. 
328 Following the so-ca lled "Wall Street rule"; Stephen M Bainbridge "The Politics Of Corporate 
Governance" ( 1995) 18 Harv J L & Pub Pol' y 671 , 695-696. 
329 Peter Burbidge "Creating Hi gh Performance Boardrooms And Workplaces - European Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Century" (2003) 28(5) EL Rev 642, 657. 
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in times of crisis of the company this could prove fatal 330 . Employees could not only 
lose their jobs, but also their savings. Again Enron provides a good example331 . The 
second possibility is giving employees a voice in the corporation, like Gennan law 
does. The main criticism against employee participation in corporate governance is 
that their interests are contrary to those of shareholders332 . Employees are intere ted 
in higher wages and job security333 . Therefore they want to keep as much money in 
the company as possible334 . Shareholders are interested in obtaining dividends and 
· · k · 335 nstng stoc' pnces . There seems to be a conflict between employees' long-tenn 
and shareholders' short-term interests. However, taking a closer look , it may be in 
the long-term interest of the company not to listen to hareholders' short-tenn 
interests. Burbidge336 concludes that "excessive focus on 'shareho lder value' is 
unhealthy for the company, the employees and ultimate ly for the shareholders 
themse lves", because it affects the company in the long run . In other word , 
involving employees (or other stakeholders) in governing the corporation mi ght be 
in the company's best interest337 . Especially for a country like ew Zealand, where 
companies always had a very high dividend payout compared to international 
standards338 , such an approach is worth considering339 . Furthermore, there are other 
advantages with employees' participati on. Employees see the company from a 
management perspective, which should improve their understanding of dec ision 340 . 
Another advantage is improved loya lty of employees with " their" company, as ca n 
330 Brett H McDonnell "The C urious Incident Of The Workers In The Boardroom" (2000) 29 Hofstra 
L Rev 503, 508. 
331 Susan J Stabile "Enron, Global Crossing, And Beyond: Implications For Workers" (2002) 76 St 
John ' L Rev 8 15, 822. 
m McDonnell, above, 512. 
133 Dana Muir "Groundings Of Voice In Employee Rights" (2003) 36 Vanderbilt J Trans nat' I L 485, 
512. 
334 Sanford M Jacoby "Employee Representation And Corporate Governance: A Missing Link" 
(200 I) 3 UPAJ LEL 449, 452-453. 
335 Marsha Cope Huie "Ami trust And Corporate Dividend Policy: Revising Dividend Payment 
Policies To Empower Shareholders To Curb Mergers And Acquisitions" ( 1993) 25 St Mary's L J 
243, 259. 
336 Peter Burbidge "Creating High Performance Boardroom And Workplace - European Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Century" (2003) 28(5) EL Rev 6-i2, 662. 
337 Dana Muir "Groundings Of Voice In Employee Rights" (2003) 36 Vanderbilt J Transnat'I L 485, 
512. 
338 Joseph I lea ly Corporate Governance And Wealth Crew ion /11 New Zealand ( I ed, Dunmore Pre s 
Ltd , Palmerston North, 2003) 2 10. 
339 The consultation process showed strong - though often modified - support fo r consideri ng 
stakeholders' interests; "Corporate Governance in ew Zealand, Principles and Guidelines" see at: 
http:/fo W\\ . sec-com. govt. nz/publ ications/doc u men ts/governance-pri nci pies/corporate-governance-in-
new-zealand. pdf ( last accessed 9 March 2004) 73. 
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be observed in Gennan or Japanese firms341 . Employees will be much more likely to 
help their company in critical situations. This might ave a company from 
insolvency in the event of a crisis. While United States worker might just walk 
away in such a situation to take the next best offer, German or Japanese employee 
might be willing to help their finn in such a crisis. Moreover, employees know their 
company in depth
342
. This enables them, for example, to contribute to improving 
production processes
343
. Apart from that, they know manage ment from day-to-day 
experience and hence can judge its perfonnance first hand344 . Finally, it should not 
be forgotten that shareholders and employees have some important common 
inte rests , like controlling directors' powers and keeping the ir remunera tion down 145 . 
This topic has no t been addressed in the United States or the United 
K . d 346 Wh ·1 h h b · · G 347 · 111 g om . 1 e sue an approac must not e as ex te nsive as 111 e rmany 1t 
might be an idea worth considering involving at lea tone employee representative in 
the board of larger New Zealand companies. 
I Other Topics 
There are some other rules and contents in the Act and the Code, which are 
briefly outlined be low. 
1 Installation of an accounting oversight board 
The Act creates the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
("PCAOB"). Each accounting firm that provides audit ervice to at least one public 
firm is subject to registrati on with the PCAOB . The PCAOB will establi sh auditing, 
'
40 Peter Burbidge "Creating Hi gh Performance Boardrooms And Worl..places - European Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Cent ury" (2003) 28(5) EL Rev 642 , 662. 
141 Sanford M Jacoby "Employee Represe nta ti on And Corporate Governance: A Missing Link" 
(200 1) 3 UPAJLEL 449, 467. 
'
42 Jacoby, above, 475. 
m Brett 1-1 Mc Donnell "The Curious Inc ident Of The Workers In The Boardroom" (2000) 29 1 lofs tra 
L Rev 503, 504. 
344 Dana Muir "Groundings Of Voice In Employee Ri ghts" (2003) 36 Vanderbilt J Transnat' I L 485, 
511-512. 
345 Pete r Burbidge "Creating I lig h Performance Boardrooms And Worl..places - European Corporate 
Governance In The Twenty First Cen lllry" (2003) 28(5) EL Rev 642, 662. 
346 Burbid ge, above, 662. 
347 Thereby avoiding the downsides of large board size and international crit icism. 
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ethics, independence, and other standards for auditing companies and oversee their 
compliance348 . The PCAOB will conduct yearly inspections of the "Big Four" audit 
companies that audit more than hundred reporting companies and control other 
companies at least every three years349 . The PCAOB can impose sanctions up to 
permanent suspension of non-complying audit companies
350
. The Board itself is 
appointed and overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
351
. 
The PCAOB 's composition reflects an attempt to establish an independent over ight 
unit. Only two of its five members are allowed to be current or former certified 
public accountants352 . Moreover, in case the chairper on is one of the two former 
accountants, she or he is not allowed to have practi sed within five years to be ing 
r1 appointed_)_. 
The question remains, whether the implementati on of such a body is 
advisable for New Zealand. Due to the outstanding importance of auditing, an 
independent body overseeing accounting companies ha some merit. However, such 
a body demands some experts to run it effec ti ve ly. This wi ll prove cost ly. 
Neverthe less, the Commission suggested implementing such an entity in ew 
Zea land, albeit the majority of respondents in the con ultation process were against 
it354 . The Commission pointed out the positive contribution to the integrity of the 
New Zea land capital marke t355 . It remains to be seen, if government adheres to the 
Commission's advice. 
2 Whistleblower protection and attorney reporting obligations 
The Act also contains provi sions to secure that whi tleb lowers and analysts 
are not puni shed for unfavourabl e reports
356
. Such protection i important to 
348 Robert W Hamilton "The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 tyle" ('.WO]) 40 Hou L R I, 56. 
349 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To 
Corpor;te Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1010. 
350 Brian Kim "Sarbane -Ox ley Act" (2003) 40 Harv J Legis 235,241. 
351 Hamilton, above, 57. 
352 Kim, above, 241. 
353 Hamilton, above, 57. 
354 "Corporate Governance in New Zea land , Principles and Guidelines" see at: hllp://www.sec-
com.govt. nz/pu bi ications/documents/governa nce-pri nc i pies/corporate-go\ ernance-i n-new-
zea land . pd f (last accessed 9 March 2004) 7. 
m "Corporate Governance in New Zea land, Principles and Guidelines", above, 7. 
356 Hamilton, above, 66. 
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encourage people to speak up in case of a developing crisis357 . Timely warning can 
sometimes prevent more seriou developments. 
The Act's obligations on attorneys go a step further. Lawyers who practi e or 
appear before the SEC must report any "evidence" of securities law violations or 
breaches of fiduciary duty to the general counsel of their client or employee in the 
case of in-house lawyers. If those do not react "appropriately" they have to report 
that to the clients audit committee358 . If this still lead to no solution the attorney ha 
to "noisily withdraw" and report to the SEC. The attorney' position has been 
described as a "watchdog" 359 . This regulation overshoots the mark. It cau e severe 
problems concerning attorney client privilege. The more genera l question anse , 
whether a company's lawyer is the " hired gun" of the company or whether an 
attorney has superior obligations to the public in certain cases
360
. 
3 Explanation of the legal system 
Large parts of the German Code do not implement any new rules, but explain 
the German legal system361 . While this primarily has to do with peculiarities of the 
Gennan system362 , which require explanation for many foreign inve tors, ew 
Zealand could neverthe less adopt the idea of explaining its corporate lega l sy tern to 
international investors. ew Zealand could survey whether internationa l investor 
are suffic ientl y informed about its corporate sy tern . In ea e there is insufficient 
information , it could be a good idea to include a part in ew Zealand' code of 
corporate governance brie fly explaining its lega l background. However, ew 
Zea land should avoid the mi sta kes made in the German Code. The German ode 
357 A great majority of respondents in the consultation process agreed; "Corporate Governance tn 
New Zea land, Principles and Guidelines", above, 67 . 
358 Douglas M Branson "Enron - When A ll System Fail: Creative Des truction Or Roadmap To 
Corporate Governance Reform?" (2003) 48 Viii L Rev 989, 1011. 
359 Hami I ton, above, 61. 
360 This questi on is beyond the scope of thi s paper; for your intere t, see Chri st ina R Salem "The New 
Mandate Of The Corporate Law yer After The Fall Of Enron And The Enactment Of The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act" (2003) 8 Fordham lnt ' I L J 765. 
361 Wolff even call s it a ' marketing gimmick'; Lutz-Christi an Wolff "Law As A Markeung Gimmick 
-The Ca e Of The German Corporate Governance Code" (2004) 3 WAUGSLR 115, 11 5. 
362 Like co-determin ati on and the dual board tructure. 
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mixes the simple reproduction of existing legislation with the principles suggested. 
There is a constant change between recommendations and mandatory legislation. 
This results in a Jack of clarity and further confu es investor 363 . In spite of that, 
there should be a separate paragraph before the principles or as part of the foreword. 
VII CONCLUSION 
No matter how ew Zealand responds to the recent events in corporate 
governance, one thing should be kept in mind. No code or legislation can entirely 
eliminate corporate failure 364 . Such failures can only be prevented by a change of 
behaviour. However, thoughtfully designed rules may at least reduce the ri k to a 
minimum. This is what makes them important. 
This paper provided an overview over the late t changes in German anu 
United States corporate governance. It has been shown that certain provi ion from 
both approaches make sense for New Zealand to adopt. Most importantly, ew 
Zealand should adopt a principles-based approach . As to the que tion of principles 
to implement, it is a fine line between achieving reasonable standards to improve 
corporate governance and imposing unnecessary burdens on companies
365
. [twill be 
crucial for New Zealand to find a reasonable way between the two. 
One thing is important. Corporate governance cannot be regulated once and 
then forgotten about. Constant review is important to en ure keeping the pnnc1plcs 
up to date and suitable for the cun-ent business environment. The German Code will 
be reviewed and adjusted annually366. New Zealand should do the same. 
363 Hans-Christoph Hirt "Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-Determination 
And Corporate Governance Reform" (2002) 23 Comp Law 349, 354. 
364 Brian Kim "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" (2003) 40 I larv J Legis 235, 252. 
365 Cathy Quinn, Peter Rowe and Chris Linton "Where To Go For Corporate Governance?" April 
2003, available online at: 
http ://wv, w .minterelli son.co.nz/d9s; l1hrary/commercial/CorporateGo_v~rnancc. df (last accessed 9 
March 200-1-) 1-2. 
366 Lutz-Christian Wolff " La\.\- A A Marketing Gimmick - The Case Of The German Corporate 
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